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Abstract
The present research examines the factors that affect how people think about the future. Chapter 1 examines
how choice affects future time perception. Two experiments manipulated the presence of choice regarding
future experiences, and asked participants to indicate their subjective temporal distance to the future
experiences. Results showed that the future experiences felt closer when people had a choice about them
compared to when they did not have such a choice. Chapter 2 examines how valence and culture affect the
sequence preference for future experiences. The results from two studies showed that people were more likely
to prefer an ascending sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and that people were more
likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences than negative experiences. They also showed
that Americans were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were more
likely to prefer a descending sequence than Americans. Chapter 3 examines how culture affects temporal
orientation. Building on prior research that has compared the cultural differences on past, present, and future
orientation, I hypothesize that East Asians focus on the past and future more than North Americans, and
North Americans focus on the present more than East Asians. It is suggested that in addition to a cultural
difference in the focus on the three temporal domains, when moving from any past or future time point
toward the present, North Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more than East Asians’ focus. I
present evidence in three categories. Specially, I compare East Asians’ and North Americans’ focus on a
temporal domain, their mental representation of a temporal domain and their subjective temporal distance to
a temporal domain.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Psychology
First Advisor
Paul Rozin
Second Advisor
Gal Zauberman
Subject Categories
Psychology
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2297
WHAT AFFECTS PROSPECTION? – AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS THAT 
AFFECT FUTURE TIME PERCEPTION, SEQUENCE PREFERENCE FOR FUTURE 
EXPERIENCE, OR FUTURE TEMPORAL ORIENTATION  
Xuan Gao 
 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
Psychology 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2017 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation              Co-Supervisor of Dissertation  
______________                              _________________ 
Paul Rozin, Ph.D.                             Gal Zauberman, Ph.D. 
Professor of Psychology                             Professor of Marketing 
 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
_________________ 
Sara Jaffee, Ph.D. 
Professor of Psychology 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
Lyle H. Ungar, Ph.D. Professor of Computer and Information Science 
Joseph W. Kable, Ph.D. Baird Term Associate Professor of Psychology 
		
ii	
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
I’m immensely grateful to my committee, Paul Rozin, Gal Zauberman, Lyle 
Ungar and Joe Kable, who have taught me to express myself with psychology. I would 
like to give special thanks to Paul Rozin, who has done far more than what an advisor or 
a mentor needs to do, and given me the guidance, support and freedom to grow as an 
intellectual and as a person.  
I’m indebted to Martin Seligman, who has deeply influenced my understanding of 
psychology research, made my graduate school experience at Penn possible, and 
supported me over the years to pursue my intellectual interests. I’m grateful that I have 
come to know Jon Baron, with whom I feel a special intellectual connection that I deeply 
appreciate and cherish. My PhD journey would not be possible without Angela 
Duckworth and James Pawelski, who have introduced me to the world of psychology 
before I started graduate school, and helped me actualize my dream to come to Penn. I 
want to thank Eli Tsukayama, who has reliably provided me with statistical advice over 
the years, and Annie Roepke, who has shared her own graduate school experiences with 
me and helped with mine.  
I’m very grateful for my graduate school experience and everyone who has been a 
part of it. They are five years of fun ideas, sparkling conversations, and intellectual and 
personal explorations. They have helped me find my calling, which I will devote the rest 
of my life to answer.   
 
		
iii	
ABSTRACT 
WHAT AFFECTS PROSPECTION? – AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS 
THAT AFFECT FUTURE TIME PERCEPTION, SEQUENCE PREFERENCE FOR 
FUTURE EXPERIENCE, OR FUTURE TEMPORAL ORIENTATION  
Xuan Gao 
Paul Rozin, Gal Zauberman 
The present research examines the factors that affect how people think about the future. 
Chapter 1 examines how choice affects future time perception. Two experiments 
manipulated the presence of choice regarding future experiences, and asked participants 
to indicate their subjective temporal distance to the future experiences. Results showed 
that the future experiences felt closer when people had a choice about them compared to 
when they did not have such a choice. Chapter 2 examines how valence and culture affect 
the sequence preference for future experiences. The results from two studies showed that 
people were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence for negative experiences than 
positive experiences, and that people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence 
for positive experiences than negative experiences. They also showed that Americans 
were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were 
more likely to prefer a descending sequence than Americans. Chapter 3 examines how 
culture affects temporal orientation. Building on prior research that has compared the 
cultural differences on past, present, and future orientation, I hypothesize that East Asians 
focus on the past and future more than North Americans, and North Americans focus on 
the present more than East Asians. It is suggested that in addition to a cultural difference 
in the focus on the three temporal domains, when moving from any past or future time 
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point toward the present, North Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more 
than East Asians’ focus. I present evidence in three categories. Specially, I compare East 
Asians’ and North Americans’ focus on a temporal domain, their mental representation of 
a temporal domain and their subjective temporal distance to a temporal domain.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
How people think about the future (i.e., prospection, Gilbert & Wilson, 2007) has 
important implications in perception, cognition, affect, memory, motivation, and action 
(Seligman, Railton, Baumeister & Sripada, 2013). Prior research has noted the adaptive 
functions of prospection, including making decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Seligman et al., 2013), solving problems, planning actions (Bar, 2007, 2009; Bar, 
Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske, 2007; Binder et al., 1999; Buckner & Vincent, 2007; 
Gollwitzer, 1999; Seligman et al., 2013; Singer, 1966; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), 
developing creative solutions (for reviews, see Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang, 
1970; Gold & Cundiff, 1980; Klinger, 1999), and achieving goals (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, 
& Armor, 1998; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2010; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). 
The present research examines the factors that affect prospection. We examine 
prospection in three aspects: future time perception, preference for future experiences, 
and future temporal orientation, and identify factors that contribute to each of them. 
Future time perception has been shown to affect intertemporal preferences (Kim 
& Zauberman, 2009; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc & Bettman, 2009) and motivation 
(Bashir, Wilson, Lockwood, Chasteen & Alisat, 2014). Prior research on the factors that 
relate to the subjective temporal distance of future events has focused on the state of the 
person, the nature of the experience or the framing of time intervals. For example, a 
delayed monetary reward felt further away when people were sexually aroused (Kim & 
Zauberman, 2013). A future gain felt further away compared to a future loss (Bilgin & 
LeBoeuf, 2010). Future outcomes felt further away when the time interval was described 
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by amounts of time rather than by dates (LeBoeuf, 2006). Chapter 1 examines how an 
intervening event related to and preceding the future experience, more specifically, a 
choice, affects the subjective temporal distance of the future. Two between-subject 
studies manipulated the presence of choice and asked participants to indicate their 
subjective temporal distance to the fictional future scenarios. A pilot study found a trend 
that a future with a choice felt closer than a future without one with undergraduate 
students. Experiment 1 tested a wider range of scenarios and valences on Mturkers, and 
replicated the finding from the pilot study with significant results. Experiment 2 
suggested that it was the presence or absence of choice rather than four other accounts 
that caused such a difference. The perceived duration of the future experience was not 
significantly different between the choice and the no choice conditions, and did not show 
a consistent trend across studies. 
Preference for future experiences. An experience can be time-framed as 
anticipated, experienced, or remembered (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992; Kahneman, 
1999). There may be a general human trend to emphasize one or the other of these 
perspectives, and there may as well be individual and cultural differences. Preferring a 
particular perspective may influence actual preferences or choices for future experiences 
(e.g., Rozin & Rozin, 2017). For example, if memory were privileged, there would be a 
tendency to seek novel experiences, because they are more likely to create new memories 
(e.g., Rozin & Rozin, 2017). If anticipation were privileged, one would put off positive 
events, but arrange to experience negative (or more negative) events sooner (Berns, et al., 
2006; Loewenstein, 1987). The anticipation privilege theory states that a privilege of 
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anticipation may correspond to a preference for an ascending sequence for positive (best-
last) as well as negative (worst-first) experiences, thus maximizing positive anticipation 
and minimizing negative anticipation (dread), respectively. Chapter 2 builds on a general 
finding that most Americans prefer sequences that get better over time (see Frederick & 
Lowenstein, 2008 for limitations). It differs from prior work in that 1) it employs more 
short term every day experiences; 2) it directly compares sequences of positive events 
and sequences of negative events in the same domain, and 3) it explores sequence 
preference, for the first time, in a non-Western culture (India), in comparison to 
Americans. The study examines how people prefer to order their everyday life 
experiences in 7 domains in the future and specifically examines the effects of valence 
and culture on the sequence preference. The results showed that people were more likely 
to prefer an ascending sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and 
that people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences 
than negative experiences. The results also showed that Americans were more likely to 
prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were more likely to prefer a 
descending sequence than Americans. For judgments of a whole life, both groups prefer a 
pattern in which well being rises gradually, a preference that is more prominent for 
Americans than Indians. We discussed each motivation to prefer an ascending or a 
descending sequence noted in Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) in light of the valence 
and cultural effects. 
Future time orientation has been shown to correlate with conscientiousness, 
consideration of future consequences, and predicts planning and achievement of future 
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goals (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Chapter 3 examines how culture affects future temporal 
orientation and specifically reviews the cultural difference between East Asian and North 
American in terms of temporal orientation. Based on the cultural differences on holistic 
versus analytical cognitive processing style, and cyclical versus linear prediction trends, 
this review hypothesizes that East Asians focus on the past and future more than North 
Americans, whereas North Americans focus on the present more than East Asians. This 
review also proposes a speculation about how the cultural difference in temporal 
orientation changes along the continuous temporal dimension of the past, present and 
future. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Choice Brings the Future Closer to the Present 
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Abstract 
How does the presence or absence of choice for a future experience affect the perceived 
temporal distance to the future experience? We predict that a future with a choice feels 
closer than a future without one based mainly on construal level theory (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). Two experiments manipulated the presence of choice regarding 
fictional future scenarios, and asked participants to indicate their subjective temporal 
distance to the future scenarios. The results of experiment 1 supported the hypothesis. 
Experiment 2 showed that it was the presence or absence of choice rather than four other 
accounts that caused the difference in time perception. We also replicated prior findings 
that positive future experiences felt further away compared to negative ones (Bilgin & 
LeBoeuf, 2010), and found that the negative future experiences felt longer in duration 
compared to positive ones. 
Keywords: time perception, prospection, choice 
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Choice Brings the Future Closer to the Present 
Suppose your family is about to take a vacation. Have you agreed on a place to go 
or do you need to choose among multiple destinations? Suppose you’re about to move 
into a new apartment. Have you signed a lease already or do you need to choose among 
multiple apartments? The contrast between a future scenario with one option (referred to 
as a closed future) and a future scenario with a choice (referred to as an open future) is 
common in everyday life. How does the presence or absence of a choice affect how 
distant the future experience seems?  
Future time perception has been shown to affect intertemporal preferences and 
goal achievement. Subjective time perception may affect the discount rate in 
intertemporal preferences (Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). It is possible 
that when people make decisions about the future, they use the subjective temporal 
distance to guide their decisions. For example, if a future reward feels further away, 
people may show a higher discount rate. People are more motivated to pursue long-term 
goals when they perceive the goals as closer to the present (Bashir, Wilson, Lockwood, 
Chasteen, & Alisat, 2014). For example, students who perceived the upcoming test to be 
closer were more motivated to prepare for the test and practiced more for the test (Peetz, 
Wilson, & Strahan, 2009). 
Prior research on the factors that relate to the subjective temporal distance of 
future events has focused on the state of the person, the nature of the experience or the 
framing of time intervals. For example, a delayed monetary reward felt further away 
when people were sexually aroused (Kim & Zauberman, 2013). A future gain felt further 
away compared to a future loss (Bilgin & LeBoeuf, 2010). Future outcomes felt further 
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away when the time interval was described by amounts of time rather than by dates 
(LeBoeuf, 2006). The current research examines how an intervening event related to and 
preceding the future experience, more specifically, a choice, affects the subjective 
temporal distance of the future.  
Why study the effect of choice on the subjective temporal distance aside from the 
fact that the contrast of a future with a choice and a future without a choice is common in 
everyday life? First, perception of the future is a major aspect of understanding humans 
and their choices. Decision scientists (e.g., Peters, Kunreuther, Sagara, Slovic & Schley, 
2012) have identified the general problem that people are disinclined to make future 
choices that have only long term future benefits (such as buying life insurance). Any 
reframing of these choices that makes them appear closer in time could promote more 
adaptive decisions. Second, it may be possible to manipulate the presence or absence of 
choice regarding future experiences with little extra cost or effort. If the relationship 
between choice and subjective temporal distance is well understood, this may be an 
efficient way to design future experiences to facilitate desirable outcomes. For example, 
teachers can create a writing assignment with a choice of paper topics, or no such a 
choice, alter the subjective temporal distance to the deadline, and ultimately affect how 
motivated students work on the assignment and how much effort they put into the 
assignment. A small change in designing the assignment can potentially improve 
academic outcome, with little extra effort from the teachers. The retirement plan may 
offer a choice of multiple saving plans or no such a choice, alter the subjective temporal 
distance to the retirement, and affect how much people save prior to retirement.  
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We predict that an open future feels closer than a closed future for three reasons. 
First, the construal level theory noted that people mentally simulate events at different 
level of concreteness and abstraction levels (Trope & Liberman, 2010). When they think 
about an event with greater details, the simulation is on a lower construal level. When 
they think about an event in a more abstract way, the simulation is on a higher construal 
level. The level of construal corresponds to, among other things, the subjective temporal 
distance to the event. Specifically, when the event is simulated at a lower construal level, 
the event feels closer. When people need to make a choice, they may think about the 
future scenario in greater details and at a lower construal level, which makes the open 
future seem closer (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Second, the need to make a choice may be 
arousing, which makes an open future feel more arousing than the closed future. Because 
more emotional scenarios seem closer (Bratfisch, Ekman, Lundberg, & Kruger, 1971; 
Zauberman, Levav, Diehl, & Bhargave, 2010), the open future may seem closer. Third, 
the need to make a choice for the open future may induce people to focus on the endpoint 
of the time interval (i.e., future experience), and decrease their attention to the interval 
duration between now and the future experience, which makes the open future seem 
closer (Zakay & Block, 1996, 1997). We further predict that the duration of the future 
experience (from the start to the end of the future experience) would not differ between 
the open and closed future, because the effect of choice proposed above doesn’t apply to 
the perceived duration of the future experience. 
The competing hypothesis is that the closed future feels closer than the open 
future, which also has support from the literature. First, because the closed future only 
has one option and the open future has multiple options, the option in the closed future is 
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more probable (indeed, certain) than each of the options in the open future. According to 
construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), more probable events are processed at 
a lower level of construal than less probable events. Thus, the option in the closed future 
is processed at a lower level of construal than each of the options in the open future, 
which may make the closed future feel closer than the open future (Trope & Liberman, 
2010). Second, because the open future has multiple options whereas the closed future 
has only one option, the open future may be harder to imagine and visualize, which may 
make the open future feel further away compared to the closed future. Third, prior 
research has shown that accessible intervening events related to the target event make the 
target event feel more distant in the past (Zauberman, Jonathan, Kristin & Rajesh, 2010). 
A choice is an intervening event related to the future experience, and the prior research 
on the past suggests that the choice may make the future experience feel further away.  
The visual judgment of distance also increases with intervening objects (Ross, & Plug, 
2002).  
Experiment 1 also tested the valence effect documented in the literature, that 
positive future experiences felt further away compared to negative ones (Bilgin & 
LeBoeuf, 2010). Prior literature examined how positive versus negative auditory stimuli 
modulated time perception, and found that negative sounds were judged to be longer than 
positive ones (Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2007; however, the 
perceived duration of pictures was affected by an interaction of valence and arousal, 
Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & Manfredini, 1997; see Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007 for a 
review of how emotions affect time perception). We did not find a direct test of the 
valence effect on perceived duration on future experiences. Based on the results from 
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auditory stimuli, we predict that the duration of the negative future experiences feels 
longer compared to the positive experiences.  
We conducted a pilot study and two experiments to test the hypothesis that an 
open future with a choice among multiple options feels closer than a closed future 
without a choice. The pilot study and Experiment 1 manipulated the presence of choice 
and asked participants to indicate their subjective temporal distance to fictional future 
scenarios. Experiment 2 examined each of five accounts that might explain the difference 
between the open and closed future in the prior two studies.  
Pilot 
Method 
238 undergraduate students (67.2% female; age M = 19.79, SD = 1.19) from the 
University of Pennsylvania participated in a pilot study and passed all three check 
questions. Participants were randomly assigned to either a choice condition where they 
read four scenarios each with five options, or a no choice condition where they read four 
scenarios each with only one option. The descriptions for the choice condition indicated 
that the choices would be made sometime between now and the start of the experiences. 
For example, the choice condition for the trip scenario read, “suppose you win a lottery 
that rewards you with a free two-week trip. They offer five possible destinations, all of 
which you happen to like. Suppose you will go on this trip and choose one out 
of five destinations. The trip will start in a month. Please take some time to imagine 
yourself in the scenario stated above. The ‘next’ button will appear in 20 seconds, but 
feel free to take as much time as you need.”  The no choice condition for the trip scenario 
was the same except it offered one possible destination instead of five. We included four 
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positive scenarios, which were taking a trip in 1 month, moving into a new apartment in 1 
month, starting an internship in 3 months, and starting graduate school in 18 months 
(valence rated as M = 21.15 - 36.90 on a -50 extremely negative to +50 extremely positive 
scale). The descriptions of all scenarios in the pilot study, Experiment 1 and 2 are 
included in the Appendix. 
Participants were asked to read and imagine four fictional scenarios one at a time, 
write down their mental simulations of the scenarios, and answer subjective temporal 
distance questions. The primary measurement was (1) how long it felt from now to the 
start of the future experience, on a very short to very long analog scale, with no numerical 
markers (Figure 1). We also asked (2) how long it felt from now to the end of the future 
experience, on a very short to very long scale, with no numerical markers; (3) how long 
the whole duration of the future experience felt to them, on a 0 (very short) to 11 (very 
long) scale1; and (4) how they felt about the future experience, on an extremely negative 
to neutral to extremely positive scale, with no numerical markers. In addition, we asked 
participants (5) how long it felt from now to one year from now; and (6) how long it felt 
from now to two years ago, both on a very short to very long scale, with no numerical 
markers, before and after the manipulation. The latter two measures were to test whether 
manipulation had an effect on the decontextualized past or future.  All measures except 
for the duration measure were on a 0-100 scale. 
Results 
To make the scores from different scenarios comparable, we transformed the raw scores 
to z scores for each scenario. Specifically, we took the mean across both conditions of a 
particular scenario, calculated the standard deviation of this combined distribution, and 
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computed a z score for each participant. We then averaged each participant’s z scores 
across scenarios. We ran independent sample t-tests between the choice and no choice 
groups on the mean z scores of the subjective temporal distance variables. Table 1 
presents the descriptive and t-test results by scenario for the pilot study. Figure 2 
summarizes the results on the primary measurement from Pilot, Experiment 1 and 2. 
Based on the measure of (1) the subjective temporal distance from now to the start 
of the future experience (abbreviated as “nts”), the choice condition (M = -.07, SD = .68, 
n = 124) felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .07, SD = .64, n = 114), t(236) = -
1.61, p = .109, d = .21. Based on the measure of (2) the subjective temporal distance 
between now and the end of the future experience (abbreviated as “nte”), the choice 
condition (M = -.07, SD = .69, n = 123) felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .10, 
SD = .67, n = 114), t(235) = -1.88, p = .062, d = .25. However, neither difference reached 
a p = .05 significance level in the pilot study. As expected, the choice (M = .01, SD = .65, 
n = 124) and no choice (M = -.03, SD = .65, n = 114) conditions did not show a 
significant difference in terms of (3) the perceived duration of the future experience, 
t(236) = .42, p = .678, d = -.06. There was a trend that the durations in the no choice 
condition were perceived to be shorter compared to the durations in the choice condition. 
For each of the two subjective temporal distance questions that were NOT 
specific to a scenario, how long it felt from now to one year from now, and how long it 
felt from now to two years ago, we computed a difference score (after manipulation – 
before manipulation) to represent the change of the subjective temporal distance between 
now and the decontextualized past or future due to the manipulation. Independent t-tests 
showed that the manipulation did not cause a significant change between the choice (M = 
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6.82, SD = 20.42, n = 117) and no choice (M = 5.31, SD = 25.11, n = 109) conditions in 
the subjective temporal distance of (5) the decontextualized future, t(224) = .50, p = .620, 
d = -.07. There was no significant difference between the choice (M = .15, SD = 24.57, n 
= 120) and no choice (M = -2.82, SD = 27.59, n = 110) conditions for (6) the 
decontextualized past either, t(228) = .86, p = .389, d = -.11.   
Discussion  
We found a trend that people felt closer to open futures (with choices) than closed 
futures (without choices), though the mean differences were NOT significant. The two 
scenarios whose “nte” difference between the choice and the no choice conditions was 
nominally significant were the two scenarios with the longest time intervals (the 
apartment and graduate school scenarios, p = .04). We speculated that, if the objective 
temporal distance between now and the future experience increased, there would be more 
room for the two conditions to differ and the mean difference between the choice and no 
choice conditions would increase. In Experiment 1, we increased the objective temporal 
distance.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
483 Mturk workers (54.5% female, age M = 37.49, SD = 11.78) completed the survey 
and passed all three check questions. All participants were located in the United States, 
older than 18 years old and native speakers of English. Participants were randomly 
assigned to a choice condition or a no choice condition. The descriptions for the choice 
condition indicated that the choices would be made sometime between now and the start 
of the experiences. We included eight scenarios: a job promotion in 18 months, attending 
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a court hearing with a high chance of winning the lawsuit in 48 months, taking a trip in 
24 months, an anniversary meal in 12 months, a job demotion in 18 months, attending a 
court hearing with a high chance of losing the lawsuit in 48 months, taking a medical 
exam in 60 months, and moving into a cheaper apartment in 14 months. The scenarios 
represented a wider range of feeling towards the future experiences compared to the pilot 
study (valence rated as M = -34.89 to +39.49 on a -50 extremely negative - 50 extremely 
positive scale).  
We wanted to test the valence effect on the subjective temporal distance, and 
therefore included the two job scenarios and the two lawsuit scenarios that were the same 
except for valence. The display order of the positive and negative scenarios was 
counterbalanced. Half of the participants responded to the positive version of the job and 
lawsuit scenarios first (and responded to all scenarios in the following order: job 
promotion, court hearing with a high chance of winning the lawsuit, trip, anniversary 
meal, job demotion, court hearing with a high chance of losing the lawsuit, medical 
exam, moving into a cheaper apartment), and the other half responded to the negative 
version of the job and lawsuit scenarios first (and responded to all scenarios in the 
following order: job demotion, court hearing with a high chance of losing the lawsuit, 
medical exam, moving into a cheaper apartment, job promotion, court hearing with a high 
chance of winning the lawsuit, trip, anniversary meal). Participants were asked to read the 
eight fictional future experiences one at a time, imagine themselves in such scenarios, 
and answer the subjective temporal distance questions: (1) how long it felt from now to 
the start of the future experience; (2) how long it felt from now to the end of the future 
experience; (3) how the whole duration of future experience felt to them; and (4) how 
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they felt about the future experience. We asked participants (1) how long it felt from now 
to one year from now, and (2) how long it felt from now to two years ago, before and 
after the manipulation. 
Results 
As in the pilot study, we transformed the raw scores to z scores for each scenario and 
used the mean z scores across scenarios as dependent variables. We conducted 
independent sample t-tests between the choice and no choice groups on the mean z scores 
of the subjective temporal distance variables. Table 2 presents the descriptive and t-test 
results by scenario for Experiment 1. 
Based on the measure of (1) the subjective temporal distance between now to the 
start of the future experience (“nts”), the choice condition (M = -.11, SD = .64, n = 243) 
felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .11, SD = .59, n = 240), t(481) = -3.96, p < 
.001, d = .36. Based on the measure of (2) the subjective temporal distance between now 
to the end of the future experience (“nte”), the choice condition (M = -.07, SD = .66, n = 
243) felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .07, SD = .60, n = 240), t(481) = -2.58, 
p = .01, d = .22. As predicted, the choice (M = -.02, SD = .57, n = 243) and no choice (M 
= .02, SD = .54, n = 240) conditions were not significantly different in terms of (3) the 
perceived duration of the future experience, t(481) = -.78, p = .436, d = .07. There was a 
trend that the durations in the choice condition were perceived to be shorter compared to 
the durations in the no choice condition. 
As in the pilot study, we computed a difference score (after manipulation – before 
manipulation) to represent the change of the subjective temporal distance between now 
and the decontextualized past or future due to the manipulation. Independent sample t-
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tests showed that the manipulation did not cause a significant change between the choice 
(M = -1.98, SD = 18.82, n = 242) and the no choice (M = .42, SD = 22.32, n = 240) 
conditions in the subjective temporal distance of (5) the decontextualized future, t(480) = 
-1.27, p = .203, d = .12. There was no significant difference between the choice (M = -
2.74, SD = 20.72, n = 240) and no choice (M = -4.75, SD = 22.92, n = 237) conditions for 
(6) the decontextualized past either, t(475) = 1.00, p = .317, d = -.09.  
The positive and negative versions of the job and the lawsuit scenarios were the 
same except for valence. To test whether there was a valence effect on the subjective 
temporal distance, we conducted paired sample t-tests between the positive and negative 
versions of the job and lawsuit scenarios2. Based on the measure of (1) the subjective 
temporal distance between now to the start of the future experience (“nts”), the job 
demotion (M = 58.60, SD = 28.89, n = 483) felt closer than the job promotion (M = 
65.24, SD = 24.93, n = 483), t(482) = 4.95, p < .001, d = -.233, and the court hearing with 
a high chance of losing (M = 76.16, SD = 27.42, n = 482) felt closer than the court 
hearing with a high chance of winning (M = 81.60, SD = 21.70, n = 482), t(481) = 4.02, p 
< .001, d = -.19. Based on the measure of (2) the subjective temporal distance between 
now to the end of the future experience (“nte”), the job demotion (M = 66.95, SD = 
28.87, n = 480) felt closer (but not significantly) than the job promotion (M = 69.36, SD = 
25.58, n = 480), t(479) = 1.75, p = .081, d = -.08, and the court hearing with a high 
chance of losing (M = 76.59, SD = 26.45, n = 481) felt closer than for the court hearing 
with a high chance of winning (M = 80.15, SD = 23.06, n = 481), t(480) = 2.73, p = .007, 
d = -.12.  (3) The duration of the job demotion (M = 7.72, SD = 2.77, n = 481) felt longer 
compared to the job promotion (M = 7.11, SD = 2.65, n = 481), t(480) = -4.75, p < .001, d 
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= .22. The duration of the court hearing with a high chance of losing felt longer (M = 
6.82, SD = 3.56, n = 482) compared to the court hearing with a high chance of winning 
(M = 5.34, SD = 3.56, n = 482), t(481) = -8.99, p < .001, d = .41.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 replicated and solidified the results from the pilot study, showing that an 
open future (with a choice) felt closer than a closed future (with no choice). In addition, 
the positive future experiences felt further away compared to the negative ones, but the 
negative future experiences felt longer in duration compared to the positive ones. The 
closed futures with no choice felt further away compared to the open futures with a 
choice, but the duration of the two future experiences did not show a significant 
difference. This suggests that the perception of “nts” and the duration of the future 
experience may not work in the same direction. 
Objectively, the temporal distance between now and the end of the future 
experience consists of (1) the distance between now and the start of the experience and 
(2) the duration of the experience. Thus, “nts” may be a better measure than “nte”, 
because the “nts” is not related to the duration of the experience whereas “nte” is.  
In fact, the measure of “nte” showed less consistent results compared to “nts”. For 
example, the only two results with a “wrong” direction were based on the “nte” measure 
(the two trip scenarios in the pilot study and Experiment 1 where the no choice condition 
was perceived to be closer than the choice condition). In Experiment 2, we used the 
results of “nts” as a measure of the subjective temporal distance between now and the 
future experience, and dropped the measure of “nte”. 
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that an open future with a choice felt closer compared to a 
closed future with no choice. We designed Experiment 2 to rule out alternative accounts 
of this basic effect (between the choice and the no choice conditions). The choice and no 
choice conditions in the pilot and Experiment 1 were different in five aspects.  
1. The choice condition required a choice, whereas the no choice condition did 
not require a choice. (The difference we intentionally manipulated, and the focus of our 
analysis) 
2. The choice condition had the future experience determined sometime between 
now and the start of the future experience, and the no choice condition had the future 
experience already determined, because there was only one option. 
3. Because one can only know about the future experience (e.g., where to go for 
the trip) after it has been determined, the two conditions differed in terms of the time to 
know about the future experience.  
The number of options was different between the two conditions. There was only 
one option in the no choice condition, which indicated both no uncertainty, and a lower 
level of uncertainty. Therefore the two conditions were different in terms of:  
4. The presence or absence of uncertainty, and 
5. A lower or higher non-zero level of uncertainty. 
In total, the two conditions were different in these five aspects, and we did not 
know which was the cause of the difference in time perception. In Experiment 2, we 
isolated each one of these five factors and tested their effects. For each factor, we created 
two conditions that were the same except for the factor to be tested. An overview of the 
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five factors and a description of the six conditions in Experiment 2 are presented in Table 
3. 
In order to test the choice factor, we created two conditions that were the same 
except for the choice dimension (Condition 1 and 2). The future experience in Condition 
1 was determined by a choice, and in Condition 2 it was determined by a random factor. 
In both conditions, the time to determine the future experience AND the time to know the 
future experience were around the start of the experience, and the number of options were 
five. 
To test whether the time to determine the future experience explained the finding, 
we created two conditions in Experiment 2 that were the same except that the future 
experience would be determined around the start of the experience in Condition 2 and the 
future experience was already determined by now in Condition 3. In both conditions, the 
future experience was to be determined by a random factor, the time to know the future 
experience was around the start of the experience, and the number of options was five. 
To test whether the time to know the future experience explained the finding, we 
created two conditions in Experiment 2 that were the same except that the future 
experience would become known around the start of the experience in Condition 3 and 
the future experience was already known by now in Condition 4. In both conditions, the 
future experience was to be determined by a random factor, the future experience was 
already determined, and the number of options was five.  
To test whether the presence of uncertainty explained the finding, we created two 
conditions that were the same except that one had five options (Condition 4) and the other 
had one option (Condition 6). In both conditions, the future experience was to be 
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determined by a random factor, and the future experience was already determined and 
known. 
If we only tested the presence of uncertainty with two conditions that contrasted 
five options versus one option, we would not be able to tell if the difference between the 
two conditions, if any, was due to the presence of uncertainty, or a lower or higher non-
zero level of uncertainty. To test whether a lower or higher non-zero level of uncertainty 
explained the finding, we created two conditions in Experiment 2 that were the same 
except that one had five options (Condition 2) and the other had two options (Condition 
5). These two conditions differed only in terms of a lower or higher non-zero level of 
uncertainty, but in both conditions where was a presence of uncertainty. In both 
conditions, the future experience was to be determined by a random factor, the future 
experience was to be determined and become known around the start of the experience.  
Condition 1 largely corresponded to the choice condition in previous studies, with 
some of the factors described more specifically. For example, the time to determine the 
future experience was specified to be around the start of the experience in Experiment 2. 
Condition 6 largely corresponded to the no choice condition in previous studies. 
Condition 1 and 6 also worked as a replication for the basic effect.  
For each factor, we tested if there was a significant difference between the two 
conditions designed to test this factor. If so, then this factor was a potential cause of the 
basic effect. If not, then this factor was unlikely to be the cause of the basic effect. 
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Method 
1317 participants (53.7% female) from Mturk completed the survey and passed all five 
check questions. All participants were located in the United States, older than 18 years 
old and native speakers of English (age M = 36.04, SD = 11.63).  
Experiment 2 followed a six condition between-subject design. To test each of the 
five factors, we created two conditions that were the same except for the factor to be 
tested. The first section in Table 3 indicates which two conditions were compared to test 
each factor, and the second section describes the factors in each condition. Experiment 2 
included four fictional future scenarios: a job demotion in 18 months, being a defendant 
in a lawsuit in 14 months, moving into a cheaper apartment in 24 months, and starting a 
physical therapy program in 16 months. The scenarios represented a feeling towards the 
future experiences ranging from M = -28.75 to 11.58 on a -50 extremely negative to 50 
extremely positive scale. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one out of the six conditions. They were 
asked to read four fictional future experiences one at a time, imagine themselves in such 
scenarios, and answer the subjective temporal distance questions: (1) how long it felt 
from now to the start of the future experience; (2) how long the whole duration of future 
experience felt to them; and (3) how they felt about the future experience. As in the 
previous two studies, we asked participants to indicate (1) how long it felt from now to 
one year from nowand (2) how long it felt from now to two years ago, before and after 
the manipulation. 
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Results and discussion 
As in the previous two studies, for each measure of the subjective temporal distance, we 
transformed the raw scores to z scores for each scenario and averaged each participant’s z 
scores across scenarios. We ran one-way ANOVAs with condition as a factor, and the 
mean z scores as dependent variables, and when the ANOVA was significant, conducted 
Tukey HSD for post hoc comparisons. Table 4 presents the descriptive results by scenario 
for Experiment 2. 
Based on the measure of (1) the subjective temporal distance between now and 
the start of the future experience (“nts”), the six conditions were significantly different, 
F(5, 1316) = 6.17, p < .001, η2 = 2.3%. The results replicated the findings from the 
previous two studies. The future experience with a choice (Condition 1; M = -.23, SD = 
.75, n = 222) felt closer than the future experience with no choice (Condition 6; M = .04, 
SD = .74, n = 219), p = .001, d = .36. The future experience determined by a choice 
(Condition 1; M = -.23, SD = .75, n = 222) felt closer than the future experience 
determined by a random factor (Condition 2; M = .00, SD = .67, n = 220), p = .007, d = 
.32. 
The time to determine the future experience did not affect the subjective temporal 
distance. There was no significant difference between Condition 2 where the future 
experiences were determined around the start of the experience (M = .00, SD = .67, n = 
220) and Condition 3 where the experiences were determined by now (M = .10, SD = .66, 
n = 223), p = .690, d = .15. The time to know the future experience did not affect the 
subjective temporal distance. There was no significant difference between Condition 3 
where the time to know the experience was around the start of the experience (M = .10, 
		
28	
SD = .66, n = 223) and Condition 4 where the experience was already known (M = .03, 
SD = .68, n = 217), p = .893, d = -.10. The presence of uncertainty did not affect the 
subjective temporal distance. There was no significant difference between Condition 4 
with five options (M = .03, SD = .68, n = 217) and Condition 6 with one option (M = .04, 
SD = .74, n = 219), p = 1.000, d = .01. A lower or a higher non-zero level of uncertainty 
did not affect the subjective temporal distance. There was no significant difference 
between Condition 2 with five options (M = .00, SD = .67, n = 220) and Condition 5 with 
two options (M = .06, SD = .67, n = 216), p = .961, d = .09. 
As expected, there was no significant difference between the six conditions in (2) 
the perceived duration of the experience, F(5, 1315) = .86, p = .506, η2 = .33%. As in the 
previous two studies, we computed a difference score (after manipulation – before 
manipulation) to represent the change of subjective temporal distance between now to the 
decontextualized past or future due to the manipulation. One-way ANOVAs showed that 
the manipulation did not cause a significant change in the subjective temporal distance 
(4) in the decontextualized future, F(5, 1310) = .459, p = .807, η2 = .18% or (5) the 
decontextualized past, F(5, 1308) = .525, p = .758, η2 = .20%.  
Experiment 2 replicated the findings from Experiment 1, that an open future with 
a choice was perceived to be closer than a closed future without a choice. Experiment 2 
further suggested that the presence of a choice was likely to explain the basic effect; and 
that the four other accounts (the time to determine the experience, the time to know the 
experience, the presence of uncertainty, and a lower or a higher non-zero level of 
uncertainty) were unlikely to explain the basic effect. 
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General Discussion 
A future with a choice was perceived to be closer than a future without one. Three 
between-subject studies manipulated the presence of choice and asked participants to 
indicate their subjective temporal distance to the fictional future scenarios. The pilot 
study found a trend that a future with a choice felt closer than a future without one with 
undergraduate students. The results suggested that this effect would be stronger in longer 
time frames. Experiment 1 tested a wider range of scenarios and valences on Mturkers, 
and replicated the finding from the pilot study with significant results. Experiment 2 
suggested that it was the presence or absence of choice rather than four other accounts 
that caused such a difference in time perception. The perceived duration of the future 
experience was not significantly different between the choice and the no choice 
conditions, and did not show a consistent trend across studies. 
Prior research showed that, when there was an intervening event related to the 
target event in the past, the target event felt more distant compared to no such intervening 
event (Zauberman et al., 2010). The prior research did not specifically test intervening 
events there were choices about the target events in the past. The current research showed 
that, when the intervening event was a behavior related to a future scenario (i.e., a 
choice), the future scenario felt closer compared to no such intervening event. When the 
intervening event was related to a future scenario but required no action (i.e., a random 
factor determines the future experience), the future scenario felt no different compared to 
no such intervening event (compare Condition 4 and 6 in Experiment 2).  
All three of the findings reported in this study examine cases where (1) a target 
event occurs at time T; (2) there is an intervening event between now and the later time 
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point T, and (3) the intervening event is related to the target event. The findings share an 
independent variable, which is the presence or absence of the intervening event, and a 
dependent variable, which is the subjective temporal distance between now and the target 
event. However, the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable are 
different, depending on the nature of the intervening event (e.g., choice or random 
outcome) or the temporal context in reference to the studies just cited (past or future). 
There may be some generalities. For example, the findings may be consistent with a 
notion that the more attention the interval duration gets, the longer the time interval 
seems (Zakay & Block, 1996, 1997). It is possible that the choice induces people to pay 
more attention to the endpoint of the time interval (i.e., future experience) and thus less 
attention to the interval duration whereas the intervening event of the past induces people 
to pay attention to the interval duration. The effect of the random outcome on attention to 
interval duration is somewhere in between. The findings are also consistent with a 
speculation that the more control the person has over the target event, the closer the target 
event seems. The person has the most control in the choice condition, less control in the 
random outcome condition, and the least control over the target event that has already 
occurred in the past. In fact, people may pay more attention to the target event that they 
have more control over, and thus less attention to the interval duration of such events, 
which makes such events seem closer. Future research may be able to examine these 
issues and provide a more systematic and comprehensive view of the relationship 
between intervening events and the subjective temporal distance. 
The present research only investigated the effect of a choice regarding the future 
experience on future time perception, e.g., a choice regarding where to go for a trip. 
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Future research could investigate how other types of choices affect future time 
perception, through which to clarify the nature of the choice that affects future time 
perception. Specifically, future research can test the effect of a choice that is relevant to 
the future experience but is NOT about the future experience itself; for example, a choice 
about which luggage to purchase for a trip. Such a choice is related to the trip, but not 
about the trip itself (e.g., where to go for a trip). Future research can also test the effect of 
a choice that is irrelevant to the future experience; for example, a choice about which 
college to go to before the start of a trip. If we interject such choices between now and 
the start of the future experience, how do they affect the subjective temporal distance 
between now and the start of the future experience? 
The contrast between the positive and negative versions of the job or lawsuit 
scenario replicated prior findings that positive future experiences felt further away 
compared to negative ones (Bilgin & LeBoeuf, 2010). In addition, we found that the 
negative future experiences felt longer in duration compared to positive ones.  
The valence manipulation had different effects on the measures including the 
present time point (“nts”/“nte”) and measures excluding the present time point 
(“duration”), so did the choice manipulation. While the “nts” or “nte” measures showed a 
significant difference between the choice and no choice conditions, the duration of the 
future experience did not. The results allude to a more general question, how does the 
special temporal point of the present affect the perception of time?  
It has been noted that a negative experience was perceived to be more intense than 
a positive experience (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001). That is, the positive and negative experiences were different in term of 
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intensity levels as well as valence. Bilgin and LeBoeuf (2010) have noted that both the 
valence effect and the intensity effect may be at work to contribute to the difference in 
time perception between positive and negative events. The present research only tested 
the valence effect and did not specifically test the effect of intensity. The job scenario’s 
positive version (M = 31.80) was rated as more intense than the negative version (M = -
16.96), and the lawsuit scenario’s negative version (M = -34.89) was rated as more 
intense than the positive version (M = 10.90). Both pairs of scenarios showed the same 
effect that the positive future experiences felt further away than the negative ones, and 
that the negative future experiences felt longer in duration than the positive ones. The 
results suggest that the difference between the positive and negative in Experiment 1 was 
due to a valence effect, rather than an intensity effect. 
The finding that the presence of choice makes the contextualized future feel closer 
has practical implications. First, we may alter the presence or absence of choice to affect 
the subjective temporal distance to the future, and facilitate desirable outcomes. For 
example, with a choice of retirement savings plans, people may feel closer to their 
retirement, discount the future less, and save more. With a choice of paper topics, 
students may feel closer to the deadline and work harder for the assignment. Such simple 
alterations of the future experience (by offering a choice or no choice) can potentially 
lead to important desirable outcomes. However, the presence of choice doesn’t make the 
decontextualized future feel closer. A choice of retirement savings plans wouldn’t make 
the next year feel closer to the present. This may suggest that the presence of choice only 
changes temporal perception in the domain of the choice. For example, a choice of 
retirement savings plans wouldn’t make people pay attention to their health condition. 
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Such questions warrant future research. We could examine (as suggested above) what 
defines the “domain” of the choice or decision. 
Second, the presence of absence of perceived choice may be malleable, which 
provides an opportunity for intervention. The presence of choice is a matter of perception 
as much as it is a reality. Factors such as cognitive style, personality, sociocultural 
systems and mental status may affect the perceived presence of choice. For example, 
divergent thinking (Guilford, 1956) or openness to experiences (McCrae & John, 1992) 
may promote the perception of multiple options. Americans are more likely than Indians 
to construe actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010). 
Rumination prompts dysphoric individuals to appraise their problems as unsolvable and 
fail to come up with effective solutions (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008). This suggests that rumination may relate to a perception of fewer choices. It is 
very likely that the perceived presence of choice makes the contextualized future feel 
closer, just as the real presence of choice does. For example, the perceived presence of 
choice related to divergent thinking and openness to experiences may make the 
contextualized future feel closer, and the perceived absence of choice related to 
rumination may make a contextualized future feel more distant. A training program 
designed to enable the individual to detect and perceive more choices may make the 
future feel closer and lead to desirable outcomes. For example, teachers may routinely 
encourage students to actively think about different options and ultimately help students 
to develop the cognitive habit to do so in a given situation. 
Third, the present research suggests a possible way for inborn advantage, choice, 
subjective temporal distance, motivation and effort, and acquired advantage to complete a 
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cycle of reinforcement. For example, people with an advantage of cognitive flexibility 
may perceive more choices, which make them feel closer to and work harder for the 
longer-term goals, and their longer-term achievements may reinforce their cognitive 
ability. People with a higher level of socioeconomic status (SES) may perceive or indeed 
have more choices, which make them feel closer to and work harder for the longer-term 
goals, which in turn place them even higher on the socioeconomic ladder. This cycle of 
reinforcement may enlarge the gap between people born with a lower or higher level of 
cognitive flexibility or SES. Such linkages warrant future research. If such linkages do 
exist, it may be possible to intervene by introducing more choices or training programs to 
increase the perceived number of choices in a given situation for people with lower SES, 
make people feel closer to their futures and become more motivated to work towards long 
term goals. 
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Footnotes 
1. We aimed to prompt the participants to respond to the subjective temporal distance 
questions based on gut feeling rather than calculation. We used a different scale for the 
duration question than the other subjective temporal distance questions. This made it 
harder for participants to “calculate” the duration of the experience by taking the 
difference between the subjective temporal distance of the end (“nte”) AND the start of 
the experience (“nts”).  
2. We used raw scores for the paired sample t-tests because the tests couldn’t be based on 
z scores. The raw scores couldn’t be averaged across scenarios because the job and 
lawsuit scenarios had different objective temporal distances. Therefore we presented the 
t-test results for the job and lawsuit scenarios separately.  
3. The Cohen’s d of the valence differences was computed with the adjustment of the 
correlation between the paired samples. 
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Appendix 
Scenario descriptions for the pilot study, and Experiment 1 and 2 
Pilot study 
Choice condition 
1. Suppose you win a lottery that rewards you with a free two-week trip. They offer five 
possible destinations, all of which you happen to like. Suppose you will go on this trip 
and choose one out of the five destinations. The trip will start in a month.  
2. Suppose you are considering renting a new apartment for a yearlong lease. You have 
found five apartments that meet your criteria. Suppose you will choose one to lease and 
move into your new home in one month.  
3. Suppose you are offered a 10-week internship position from five different companies. 
You like each of these positions. Suppose you will accept one of the five offers and start 
working as an intern in three months.  
4. Suppose you’ve been accepted by five two-year graduate degree programs and you 
like all of them. Suppose you will accept one of the five offers and start the program in 1 
year and a half.  
No choice condition 
1. Suppose you win a lottery that rewards you with a free two-week trip to a destination 
that you happen to like. Suppose you will go on this trip, which will start in a month.  
2. Suppose you are considering renting a new apartment for a yearlong lease. You have 
found one apartment that meets your criteria. Suppose you will rent this apartment and 
move into your new home in one month.  
3. Suppose you are offered a 10-week internship position in a company that you like. 
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Suppose you will accept the position and start working as an intern in three months.  
4. Suppose you’ve been accepted by one two-year graduate program that you like. 
Suppose you will accept the offer and start the program in 1 year and a half.  
Experiment 1 
Choice condition 
1. Suppose you are offered a job promotion, which involves a 3-year renewed job 
contract and the opportunity to transfer to one of five departments that you’ve been 
wanting to join. Suppose you will choose one department and start working in the new 
department in 18 months.  
2. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to win. The lawyer 
offers five approaches to proceed with the case, and you need to choose one out of the 
five. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The court hearing will take 4 hours.  
3. Suppose you’re planning your dream vacation. It will be a two-month trip. You’ve 
narrowed down to five destinations that you really like and will choose one of them. 
Because you have a busy schedule and some of the places on your itinerary have a long 
waitlist, the earliest date to go on this vacation is in 2 years.  
4. Suppose you decide to make a reservation at a restaurant that requires a long wait to 
celebrate an anniversary next year (in 12 months). You narrowed down to five restaurants 
that you like and will choose one of them. The prix fixe meals usually consist of nine 
courses and last for four hours.  
5. Suppose your department gets eliminated and you job position no longer exists. The 
company offers you a 3-year renewed job contract and the opportunity to transfer to one 
of five departments. This will be a step down for you, and you don’t find this new 
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arrangement particularly desirable. However, you decide to choose one department to 
join and start working in the new department in 18 months.  
6. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to lose. The lawyer 
offers five approaches to proceed with the case, and you need to choose one out of the 
five. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The court hearing will take 4 hours.  
7. Suppose you need to get a routine medical exam in 5 years. The exam will be painful 
but not harmful, and last for 2 hours. You can choose to get the exam from five different 
hospitals. Suppose you will choose one hospital and get the exam.  
8. Suppose you lost your job recently and had to 3ind a cheaper place to live. You’ve 
searched apartment listings and found 3ive apartments within your budget. Suppose you 
will choose one apartment to lease and move into your new home in 14 months. The 
lease lasts for 2 years.  
No choice condition 
1. Suppose you are offered a job promotion, which involves a 3-year renewed job 
contract and the opportunity to transfer to a department that you’ve been wanting to join. 
Suppose you will start working in the new department in 18 months.  
2. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to win. The lawyer 
offers one approach to proceed with the case. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The 
court hearing will take 4 hours.  
3. Suppose you’re planning your dream vacation to a destination that you really like. It 
will be a two-month trip. Because you have a busy schedule and some of the places on 
your itinerary have a long waitlist, the earliest date to go on this vacation is in 2 years.  
4. Suppose you decide to make a reservation at a restaurant that you like to celebrate an 
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anniversary next year (in 12 months) as it requires a long wait. The prix fixe meals 
usually consist of nine courses and last for four hours.  
5. Suppose your department gets eliminated and you job position no longer exists. The 
company offers you a 3-year renewed job contract and the opportunity to transfer to 
another department. This will be a step down for you, and you don’t find this new 
arrangement particularly desirable. However, you decide to join the new department and 
start working in 18 months.  
6. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to lose. The lawyer 
offers one approach to proceed with the case. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The 
court hearing will take 4 hours.  
7. Suppose you need to get a routine medical exam in one hospital in 5 years. The exam 
will be painful but not harmful, and last for 2 hours.  
8. Suppose you lost your job recently and had to find a cheaper place to live. You have 
found one apartment that meets your criteria. Suppose you will lease this apartment and 
move into your new home in 14 months. The lease lasts for 2 years.  
Experiment 2 
Condition 1 
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a 
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18 
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of 
which will be a step down for you. In 18 months, you have to decide which of the five 
departments to join and start working in the new department.  
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take 
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a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought 
of five different strategies for your defense. It’s up to you to choose which one strategy to 
use. You need to decide one month before the first hearing in 14 months.  
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for 
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have 
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer 
affordable housing. You will decide which one of the five to rent one month before the 
move and move into your new home in 16 months. The lease lasts for 2 years.  
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps 
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your 
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. In 2 years, you will 
decide which one to join and start the physical therapy.  
Condition 2 
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a 
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18 
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of 
which will be a step down for you. The company will transfer you to the department that 
happens to have a vacancy in 18 months. The result is out of your control. You will know 
about which department to join and start working in the new department in 18 months.  
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take 
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought 
of five different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting 
determines the best strategy to use. You will know which strategy to use one month 
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before the first hearing in 14 months.  
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for 
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have 
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer 
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for all five. You plan to move into the one that 
happens to have a vacancy in 16 months. You will know which apartment building has a 
vacancy one month before the move and move into your new home in 16 months. The 
lease lasts for 2 years.  
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps 
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your 
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the 
waitlist for all five. You will join the one that happens to have a spot available in 2 years, 
at which time you will know which program to join and start the physical therapy.  
Condition 3 
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a 
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18 
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of 
which will be a step down for you. The company will transfer you to the department that 
happens to have a vacancy in 18 months. The result is out of your control. The company 
already knows which employee will leave in 18 months at the end of the contract, and the 
department you will join, but it’s their policy to not inform you until 18 months later, at 
the time you will start working in the new department.  
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take 
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a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought 
of five different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting 
determines the best strategy to use. Which piece of evidence still exists and is available to 
the lawyer is a certainty at this point, but you won’t know until the lawyer conducts a 
thorough search for the evidence. You will know which strategy to use one month before 
the first hearing in 14 months.  
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for 
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have 
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer 
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for all five. You plan to move into the one that 
happens to have a vacancy in 16 months. The leasing office already knows which 
building will have a vacancy in 16 months, but it’s their policy to not inform people until 
one month before the move. You will move into the new home in 16 months. The lease 
lasts for 2 years.  
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps 
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your 
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the 
waitlist for all five. The program coordinator already knows which program will have a 
spot available in 2 years, but it’s their policy to not inform you until 2 years later, when 
you start the physical therapy.  
Condition 4 
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a 
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18 
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months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of 
which will be a step down for you. One of the departments happens to have a vacancy in 
18 months. The company just decided and told you that you will be transferred to this 
department and start working in the new department in 18 months.  
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take 
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought 
of five different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting 
determines the best strategy to use. Just now the lawyer has finished the search for 
evidence and thus determined which strategy to use.  
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for 
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have 
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer 
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for all five. Just now the real estate agent told 
you which one of the buildings would have a vacancy in 16 months. You plan to move 
into this apartment building in 16 months. The lease lasts for 2 years.  
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps 
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your 
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the 
waitlist for all five. The program coordinator just told you which one program would 
have a spot available in 2 years and that would be the program for you to join. You will 
start the physical therapy in 2 years.  
Condition 5 
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a 
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5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18 
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in two departments, both of 
which will be a step down for you. The company will transfer you to the department that 
happens to have a vacancy in 18 months. The result is out of your control. You will know 
about which department to join and start working in the new department in 18 months.  
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take 
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought 
of two different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting 
determines the best strategy to use. You will know which strategy to use one month 
before the first hearing in 14 months.  
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for 
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have 
been searching apartment listings and have found two apartment buildings that offer 
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for both. You plan to move into the one that 
happens to have a vacancy in 16 months. You will know about which apartment building 
has a vacancy one month before the move and move into your new home in 16 months. 
The lease lasts for 2 years.  
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps 
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your 
doctor recommends two physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the 
waitlist for both. You will join the one that happens to have a spot available in 2 years, at 
which time you will know which program to join and start the physical therapy.  
Condition 6 
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1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a 
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18 
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in one other department, 
which will be a step down for you. In 18 months, the company will transfer you to this 
department and you will start working in the new department.  
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take 
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought 
of a strategy for your defense. You will use this strategy to defend.  
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for 
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have 
been searching apartment listings and have found one apartment building that offers 
affordable housing. Just now the real estate agent told you that the building would have a 
vacancy in 16 months. You plan to move into this apartment building in 16 months. The 
lease lasts for 2 years.  
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps 
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your 
doctor recommends a physical therapy program that you can join. The program 
coordinator just told you that the program would have a spot available in 2 years, at 
which time you will start the physical therapy.
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Table 1. Subjective temporal distance between now and the start of future experience ("nts"), now and 
the end of future experience ("nte"), duration of future experiences, by scenario, Pilot 
DV Scenario 
Objective 
duration 
(in 
"months") 
(4) Valence (-
50=extremely 
negative; 
50=extremely 
positive) 
  Choice No choice t df p 
Cohen's 
d 
(1) nts 
trip 1 36.9 
M 42.56 46.23 
-1.1 230 0.29 0.14 SD 27.04 25.76 
N 121 111 
apartment 1 25.58 
M 41.54 42.89 
-0.4 225 0.69 0.05 SD 24.72 26.34 
N 121 106 
internship 3 25.64 
M 55.59 58.76 
-1 230 0.3 0.14 SD 22.86 23.86 
N 120 112 
graduate 
school 18 21.15 
M 74.43 78.85 
-1.7 231 0.1 0.22 SD 19.47 21.24 
N 121 112 
(2) nte 
trip 1.5 36.9 
M 52.92 51.49 
0.41 220 0.69 -0.05 SD 25.38 27.3 
N 117 105 
apartment 13 25.58 
M 71.47 77.16 
-2.1 229 0.04 0.27 SD 21.23 20.16 
N 120 111 
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internship 5.5 25.64 
M 68.47 71.95 
-1.2 226 0.23 0.16 SD 20.02 23.63 
N 119 109 
graduate 
school 42 21.15 
M 83 88.25 
-2.1 225 0.04 0.28 SD 20.82 17.11 
N 121 108 
(3) 
duration 
trip 0.5 36.9 
M 5.26 4.79 
1.58 227 0.12 -0.21 SD 2.37 2.17 
N 121 108 
apartment 12 25.58 
M 6.66 6.61 
0.16 223 0.87 -0.02 SD 2.26 2.36 
N 119 106 
internship 2.5 25.64 
M 6.32 6.29 
0.09 226 0.93 -0.01 SD 2.17 2.6 
N 120 108 
graduate 
school 24 21.15 
M 7.37 7.75 
-1.2 230 0.24 0.16 SD 2.35 2.51 
N 122 110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
51	
Table 2. Subjective temporal distance between now and the start of future experience ("nts"), now and the end of 
future experience ("nte"), and duration of the future experience, by scenario, Experiment 1 
DV Scenario 
Objective 
duration 
(in 
"months") 
(4) Valence (-
50=extremely 
negative; 
50=extremely 
positive).  
  Choice No choice t df p 
Cohen's 
d 
(1) nts 
job promotion 18 31.8 
M 61.68 68.84 
-3.19 481 0.002 0.29 SD 25.03 24.36 
N 243 240 
court hearing 
with a high 
chance of 
winning 
48 10.9 
M 79.28 83.89 
-2.34 481 0.019 0.21 SD 22.62 20.48 
N 243 240 
trip 24 39.49 
M 75.52 76.76 
-0.59 481 0.557 0.05 SD 23.75 22.64 
N 243 240 
anniversary 
meal 12 28.82 
M 62.7 65.04 
-1.04 481 0.298 0.09 SD 24.3 24.98 
N 243 240 
job demotion 18 -16.96 
M 54.01 63.25 
-3.56 481 0 0.32 SD 28.85 28.23 
N 243 240 
court hearing 
with a high 48 -34.89 
M 72.58 79.81 -2.92 468 0.004 0.27 SD 29.5 24.67 
		
52	
chance of 
losing N 243 239 
routine medical 
exam 60 -24.16 
M 72.3 77.83 
-2.12 481 0.035 0.19 SD 28.92 28.54 
N 243 240 
apartment 14 4.19 
M 53.52 62.95 
-3.75 478 0 0.34 SD 27.57 27.46 
N 241 239 
(2) nte 
job promotion 54 31.8 
M 67.33 71.45 
-1.77 478 0.077 0.16 SD 25.58 25.47 
N 243 237 
court hearing 
with a high 
chance of 
winning 
48.0055 10.9 
M 78 82.27 
-2.04 474 0.041 0.19 SD 24.46 21.32 
N 243 240 
trip 26 39.49 
M 72.71 72.05 
0.28 480 0.783 -0.03 SD 26.29 26.24 
N 242 240 
anniversary 
meal 12.0055 28.82 
M 62.59 65.76 
-1.37 477 0.172 0.13 SD 25.77 24.89 
N 241 238 
job demotion 54 -16.96 
M 64.47 69.3 
-1.84 481 0.066 0.17 SD 29.48 28.08 
N 243 240 
court hearing 
with a high 48 -34.89 
M 74.72 78.47 
-1.56 479 0.12 0.14 SD 27.49 25.28 
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chance of 
losing N 241 240 
routine 
medical exam 60.0028 -24.16 
M 75.65 80.18 
-1.89 481 0.059 0.17 SD 26.96 25.68 
N 243 240 
apartment 38 4.19 
M 63.06 69.87 
-2.84 477 0.005 0.26 SD 25.85 26.64 
N 241 238 
(3) 
duration 
job promotion 36 31.8 
M 6.96 7.27 
-1.26 479 0.207 0.12 SD 2.57 2.72 
N 242 239 
court hearing 
with a high 
chance of 
winning 
0.0055 10.9 
M 5.46 5.21 
0.77 481 0.444 -0.07 SD 3.54 3.58 
N 243 240 
trip 2 39.49 
M 5.38 5.52 
-0.49 479 0.627 0.05 SD 3.08 2.96 
N 243 238 
anniversary 
meal 0.0055 28.82 
M 6.49 6.18 
1.12 479 0.264 -0.1 SD 3.02 3.18 
N 242 239 
job demotion 36 -16.96 
M 7.56 7.89 
-1.3 481 0.193 0.12 SD 2.84 2.69 
N 243 240 
court hearing 
with a high 0.0055 -34.89 
M 6.81 6.84 0.1 480 0.922 0.01 
SD 3.48 3.65 
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chance of 
losing N 242 240 
routine 
medical exam 0.0028 -24.16 
M 6.64 6.99 
-1.05 480 0.296 0.1 SD 3.54 3.73 
N 242 240 
apartment 24 4.19 
M 6.29 6.58 
-1.08 478 0.279 0.1 SD 2.9 2.83 
N 240 240 
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Table 3. Condition Summary for Experiment 2 
Factor Condition 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
The two conditions compared to test each factor 
Future experience 
determined by a 
choice or a random 
factor 
X X     
Time to determine 
the future 
experience   
X X    
Time to know the 
future experience   X X   
Presence of 
uncertainty    X  X 
A lower or higher 
non-zero level of 
uncertainty: number 
of options, given 
that there are more 
than 1 option 
 X   X  
A description of the factors for each condition 
Future experience 
determined by a 
choice or a random 
factor 
choice random factor 
random 
factor 
random 
factor 
random 
factor 
random 
factor 
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Time to determine 
the future 
experience  
around the 
start of the 
experience 
around the 
start of the 
experience 
by now 
(already 
determined) 
by now 
(already 
determined) 
around the 
start of the 
experience 
by now 
(already 
determined) 
Time to know the 
future experience 
around the 
start of the 
experience 
around the 
start of the 
experience 
around the 
start of the 
experience 
by now 
(already 
known) 
around the 
start of the 
experience 
by now 
(already 
known) 
Number of options 5 5 5 5 2 1 
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Table 4. Subjective temporal distance between now and the start of future experience ("nts") by scenario, 
Experiment 2 
DV Scenario 
Objective 
duration 
(in 
"months") 
Valence (-
50=extremely 
negative; 
50=extremely 
positive).  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cohen's d 
between 
Condition 
1 and 6 
nts 
job 
demotion 18 -8.72 
M 47.24 51.22 53.79 50.29 47.77 48.35 
0.04 SD 25.43 25.69 28.84 26.69 27.07 27.52 
N 222 220 222 217 215 218 
defendant 
of a 
lawsuit 
14 -28.75 
M 50.83 61.11 62.3 55.47 63.05 56.91 
0.22 SD 26.7 26.38 26.85 27.41 27.66 28.57 
N 222 220 223 217 216 218 
apartment 24 11.58 
M 53.32 55.46 60.44 59.01 58.1 59.77 
0.26 SD 24.23 23.95 23.78 24.27 25.05 24.62 
N 222 220 222 217 215 217 
physical 
therapy 16 5.31 
M 67.4 74.57 75.58 79.08 78.57 80.01 
0.53 SD 25.17 22.53 21.33 22.72 21.4 22.47 
N 222 220 223 217 216 219 
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Figure 1. The primary measure, i.e., the subjective temporal distance between now and 
the start of the future experience, displayed on the Qualtrics survey for the trip scenario. 
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Figure 2. Mean z-scored subjective temporal distance from now to the start of the future 
experience (“nts”) by condition (Pilot, Experiment 1 and 2). Error bars indicate standard 
errors of the mean.
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CHAPTER 2 
Valence and Culture Affect Sequence Preference 
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Abstract 
The present research examines the effects of valence and culture on sequence preference 
for everyday life experiences. It differs from prior work in that 1) it compares sequence 
preferences of symmetrical positive and negative events in the same domain, and 2) it 
explores sequence preference, for the first time, in a non-Western culture (Asian India), 
in comparison to Americans. The results from two studies showed that, when given a 
choice of ascending, descending and other sequences, people were more likely to prefer 
an ascending sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and that 
people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences than 
negative experiences. They also showed that Americans were more likely to prefer an 
ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were more likely to prefer a descending 
sequence than Americans. Despite the cultural difference, the majority of Americans and 
Indians showed a preference for an ascending sequence for life experience as a whole. 
People have shown a medium to large level of individual consistency in their sequence 
preference. We discussed each motivation to prefer an ascending or a descending 
sequence noted in Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) in light of the valence and cultural 
effects.  
Keywords: sequence preference, experience, valence, culture 
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Valence and Culture Affect Sequence Preference 
Prior research based on western samples has found that people generally prefer an 
ascending sequence when given a choice between an ascending sequence and a 
descending sequence for positive as well as negative events (e.g., Loewenstein & 
Sicherman, 1991; see Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008 for a discussion on the limitations 
of the finding). Prior research has not systematically examined the sequence preference 
for everyday life experiences. Everyday life experiences constitute a large part of 
people’s daily experiences. Everyday life experiences can become more appealing when 
arranged in a preferred sequence. For example, a restaurant that presents dishes with a 
preferred sequence on a tasting menu may attract more customers and/or provide a more 
pleasant dining experience. The presentation sequence of negative experiences may 
influence preferences. It is possible to alter the sequences of experiences to facilitate 
desirable outcomes. For example, doctors may design a treatment plan with a better 
medical outcome in a preferred sequence to increase the chance that patients opt in for 
the treatment plan. Teachers may design the reading assignments in a preferred sequence 
to increase the chance that the students work on the assignments.  
1. In the present research, we examine the valence effect of sequence preference. 
Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative situations? The 
asymmetry between the positive and the negative has been noted in the prior literature 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). For 
example, negative potency indicates that negative entities are stronger than the equivalent 
positive entities. As noted by Frederick and Loewenstein (2008), people may prefer an 
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ascending sequence to increase the positive anticipation and decrease the dread (Berns, et 
al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987). Dread may be stronger than the positive anticipation due 
to negative potency, which may drive people to show a stronger preference for an 
ascending sequence for negative than for positive situations.  
In fact, prior research has suggested that people may show a stronger preference 
for an ascending sequence for negative than positive situations. For example, Frederick 
and Loewenstein (2008) asked participants to specify their preferred allocation of 30 
events, such as 30 headaches, over an 8 year interval. More people chose an ascending 
sequence for negative experiences such as headaches than positive experiences such as 
massages or sushi dinners, and more people chose a descending sequence for such 
positive experiences than for such negative experiences (see Table 3 in Frederick & 
Loewenstein, 2008, Study 1a and 1b). Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) noted that 
people showed a greater disposition to accelerate bads than to postpone goods because 
aversive dread was more potent than pleasurable anticipation. In the present research, we 
created symmetrical positive and negative experiences, and examined the effect of 
valence on sequence preference. 
It is possible that the preferred sequence of events may be at least partly a 
function of culture. Prior research on sequence preference has used western samples. 
Most studies used American samples (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993; 
Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). Some studies included Canadian (e.g., Redelmeier & 
Kahneman, 1996) and UK samples (e.g., Read & Powell, 2002). No study to our 
knowledge has compared the sequence preference between U.S. Americans and any non-
Western group; the present research examines this by comparing Americans and Indians. 
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Prior research has identified differences between Asian Indian cultures or more 
generally, South and East Asian countries and North Americans. For example, when 
asked to indicate which of “anger, happiness, shame” did not belong with the other two, 
Americans tended to pick “happiness” because it was the only positive item, whereas 
Indians were much more likely to pick “anger” because it was an emotion that was 
socially disruptive, whereas the other two, “happiness” and “shame”, were socially 
constructive emotions (Menon & Shweder, 1997; Rozin, 2003). More generally, the more 
communal South and East Asian countries seem to privilege communal values over 
individualistic values (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Communal frameworks tend to focus 
less on the pleasure dimension. 
One of the reasons for people to choose an ascending sequence, as noted in 
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008), was that people extended the presented sequences 
according to the trends. For example, people may have projected an ascending sequence 
such as (5, 6, 7) to (5, 6, 7, 8) and a descending sequence such as (7, 6, 5) to (7, 6, 5, 4). 
Because the ascending sequence has a projected sequence with a higher total value, 
people prefer an ascending sequence. It has been shown that when predicting a trend, 
North Americans tended to predict a linear trend (e.g., what has been going up will 
continue to go up), whereas East Asians tended to predict a cyclical trend (e.g., what has 
been going up will go down) (Ji, 2005). Although not directly tested on Indians, the 
results suggest that there may be South/East Asian versus American differences in terms 
of how people predict trend, which according to Frederick and Loewenstein (2008), may 
affect people’s preference for an ascending sequence. 
2. In the present research, we compared the sequence preference between U.S. 
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Americans and Asian Indians to examine whether the preference for an ascending 
sequence was generalizable beyond the western sample, and to explore possible cultural 
differences between Americans and Indians in sequence preference.  
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? Does 
favoring ascending (or descending) sequences in one domain correlate with favoring the 
same in other domains? Most studies examined the relationships of sequence preference 
in domains such as money, health, environment, career, etc. (e.g. Chapman, 1996a; 
Chapman, 1996b; Chapman, & Elstein, 1995; Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Schoenfelder & 
Hantula, 2003). There were mixed findings regarding whether people showed consistency 
across such domains. Whereas some studies found little consistency of preference across 
such domains (Chapman, 1996a; Chapman, 1996b; Duffy & Smith, 2013; Schoenfelder 
& Hantula, 2003); other studies found consistency of preference across some domains 
(Chapman & Weber, 2006; Hardisty & Weber, 2009). We extended these studies by 
exploring a set of 14 everyday experiences. For example, do people prefer to eat dishes in 
a meal in the same sequence that they prefer to make phone calls?  
4. What is the sequence preference for life experience as a whole? We asked 
participants to indicate their sequence preference for a whole life experience, and 
compared the results with their sequence preference for everyday life experiences. We 
examined whether everyday life experiences differed from the whole life experience in 
terms of preferred sequence.  
In two studies, we asked participants to indicate their sequence preferences in 
various everyday life experiences, balanced across negative and positive sequences, or 
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life experience as a whole, and explored their responses with an emphasis of the four 
questions noted above. 
Study 11 
Method  
Two hundred and thirty eight Mturk Americans and 455 Mturk Indians 
participated in the study. 512 Mturk workers completed the online survey and 408 passed 
all five catch questions and were included in the analysis. An example of a catch question 
was “please add 3 to 54 and put the answer in the box.” The analysis included 190 Mturk 
Americans (64.7% female; mean age = 36.3) and 218 Mturk Indians (35.8% female; 
mean age = 31.3)2. 
Participants were asked to select the sequence in which they prefer to proceed in 
fourteen scenarios. For example, participants were asked, “if you have a plan to eat three 
dishes on the same platter in a meal right now (e.g., meat, potatoes and a vegetable), and 
you like all of the dishes, in which order do you prefer to proceed? ” In this scenario, the 
participants were asked to indicate their preferences to order three positive items of the 
same sort. For each positive scenario, we created a corresponding negative scenario, 
which for the meal scenario was, “if you have a plan to eat three dishes on the same 
platter in a meal right now (e.g., meat, potatoes and a vegetable), and you dislike all of 
the dishes (you are hungry and there are no alternative foods), in which order do you 
prefer to proceed? ” 
For each scenario, participants were presented with four options: a descending 
		
67	
sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat my most favorite dish first and eat my least favorite dish 
last”), an ascending sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat my least favorite dish first and eat my 
most favorite dish last”), any other sequence (e.g., “I prefer to approach the foods in a 
different order than any described above. What I prefer to do is__”) and no particular 
sequence (e.g., “I prefer to not do the ordering of the foods in any particular way”).  
We asked for the sequence preference for the life experience as a whole, given 
that the total amount of goodness in life was constant across options, to contrast with the 
sequence preference for everyday life experiences. “Suppose the curves below represent 
everything you care about in your life: happiness, meaning, health, etc. The y-axis 
represents how good your life is taken as a whole; the x-axis represents your age.” We 
provided seven options including a descending sequence, an ascending sequence, a flat 
sequence, a sequence with a peak in the middle, a sequence with a low point in the 
middle, any other sequence, or indifferent to any sequence, with the first five options 
each represented by a curve. 
We asked participants to rank the importance of anticipation, experience, and 
memory for positive and negative experiences respectively. Specifically, for positive 
experiences we asked, “think of a positive experience, like going to a favorite sports 
event or concert. We can talk about three aspects of this experience. First is the 
anticipation of the experience: You have the ticket and enjoy thinking about going. 
Second is the actual experience of the event: You are attending it.Third is the memories 
of the event: You remember the different things that happened during it. This could be 
immediately after the event, or days, months or years later. Generally, how important do 
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you think anticipation, experience, and memories of POSITIVE experiences are for you, 
in your life? Please rank the three.” For negative experiences, we asked, “think of a 
negative experience, like going to see your dentist or disputing a bill. We can talk about 
three aspects of this experience. First is the anticipation of the experience: You are 
scheduled to see your dentist and dread going. Second is the actual experience of the 
event: You are attending it.Third is the memories of the event: You remember the 
different things that happened during it. This could be immediately after the event, or 
days, months or years later. Generally, how important do you think anticipation, 
experience, and memories of NEGATIVE experiences are for you in your life? Please 
rank the three.” 
Results 
The basic results on sequence preference are presented in Table 1. We collapsed 
the two non ascending/descending choices (other and no particular sequence) into one 
“other” category.  The table presents the frequency of ascending, descending, and other 
choices for Americans, Indians, and for the total sample. Results for a given domain in  
the positive version are followed by results for the same domain in the negative version, 
with this pattern repeated for each domain.  
The ascending sequence was the predominant choice for Americans in all seven 
negative scenarios and five (out of seven; except for the positive meal and positive 
project scenario) positive scenarios. The ascending sequence was not the predominant 
choice for Indians in any scenarios. The descending sequence was the predominant 
choice for Indians in all fourteen scenarios. The descending sequence was the 
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predominant choice for Americans in one (positive project) out of the fourteen scenarios. 
We created binary variables for each scenario to indicate an ascending (or a descending) 
sequence was chosen or not, and averaged the binary variables for an ascending (or a 
descending) sequence across fourteen scenarios. The correlation between the mean 
ascending and mean descending for the total sample was, r(381) = -.67, p < .001. 
1. Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative 
situations? Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for negative 
scenarios (M = .41, SD = .33) was stronger than the mean ascending preference for 
positive scenarios (M = .35, SD = .32), t(382) = -3.46, p = .001.  
The importance ranking of positive anticipation didn’t correlate with the 
preference for an ascending sequence for positive experiences, r(347) = -.03, p = .573, 
and the importance ranking of dread didn’t correlate with the preference for an ascending 
sequence for negative experiences, r(322) = -.05, p = .372. The results were in the right 
direction that a higher ranking of positive anticipation or dread corresponded to a 
stronger preference for an ascending sequence. Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean 
descending preference for positive scenarios (M = .47, SD = .35) was stronger than the 
mean descending preference for negative scenarios (M = .36, SD = .34), t(382) = 6.34, p 
< .001.  
Is there a difference in the value placed on anticipation by valence? 
Negative anticipation was ranked as more important than the positive anticipation by a 
paired-sample t test that compared the rankings of the positive (M = 2.42, SD = .76) and 
negative anticipation (M = 2.06, SD = .79), t(313) = 5.93, p < .001. This finding is 
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consistent with the position that anticipation importance may play a role in the 
predominance of ascending in the negative situation. 
2. Is there a difference in sequence preference between Americans and Indians? 
Based on an independent sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for Americans (M 
= .48, SD = .30) was stronger than the mean ascending preference for Indians (M = .29, 
SD = .24), t(345) = 6.54, p < .001. Is there a difference in the value placed on anticipation 
by culture? For positive experiences, Indians (M = 2.38, SD = .75) rated anticipation 
higher than Americans (M = 2.52, SD = .72), t(355) = 1.77, p = .078, but not 
significantly. For negative experiences, Americans (M = 2.04, SD = .78) rated 
anticipation higher than Indians (M = 2.09, SD = .82), t(338) = -.50, p = .618, again not a 
significant difference. Therefore, we cannot use anticipation importance to explain the 
cultural difference in their preference for an ascending sequence. Based on an 
independent sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for Indians (M = .55, SD = .28) 
was stronger than the mean ascending preference for Americans (M = .26, SD = .25), 
t(381) = -10.52, p < .001. 
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? The 
correlations between the binary variables for an ascending sequence among the fourteen 
scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(404) = .09, p = .075 to r(403) = .56, p < .001, 
with an average correlation of r = .29, which approached a medium level of consistency. 
The correlations between the descending sequence binary variables among the fourteen 
scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(404) = .15, p < .01 to r(401) = .59, p < .001, 
with an average correlation of r = .33, which suggested a medium level of consistency. 
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4. What is the sequence preference for life experience as a whole? Despite their 
differences in sequence preference regarding everyday life experiences, more than half of 
Americans as well as Indians preferred an ascending sequence for the life experience 
taken as a whole (Table 2)3. The distribution of sequence preference was contingent on 
the culture, χ2 (6) = 18.68, p = .005. To test the cultural difference in the preference for an 
ascending (or descending) sequence, we created a binary variable to represent an 
ascending (or descending) sequence was chosen or not. Independent sample t-tests 
showed that Indians (M = .05, SD = .22) were more likely to prefer a descending 
sequence compared to Americans (M = .02, SD = .12), t(697.88) = -2.75, p = .006. There 
was a trend that Americans (M = .55, SD = .50) were more likely to prefer an ascending 
sequence compared to Indians (M = .51, SD = .50), though the difference was not 
significant, t(821) = 1.03, p = .306. 
Study 2 
In Study 1, for each experience, the positive scenario was presented first, followed by the 
corresponding negative scenario. All participants responded to the questions in the same 
order. To rule out the possibility that the display order of valence accounted for the 
valence difference observed in Study 1, Study 2 counterbalanced the display order of 
valence.  
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Method 
Four hundred and ninety two Mturk Americans participated in the study. 469 
(44.6% female; mean age = 37.29) participants passed all five catch questions and were 
included in the analysis.  
Participants were randomly assigned to respond to either seven positive scenarios 
first (n = 233), or seven negative scenarios first (n = 236). For the seven scenarios of the 
same valence, we randomized the order in which they were presented for each 
participant. Participants were asked to select the sequence in which they prefer to proceed 
in the same fourteen scenarios as in Study 1 except that each scenario only consisted of 
two exemplars instead of three (e.g., two dishes in a meal rather than three). For each 
scenario, we presented three options: a descending sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat the dish 
that I like better first”), an ascending sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat the dish that I like 
better second”) and “neither of above.” 
We also asked participants to respond to the importance ranking questions, which 
were the same as in Study 1, with the display order of valence counterbalanced. 
Participants who responded to the seven positive (or negative) scenarios first also 
responded to the positive (or negative) importance ranking question first.    
Results 
The basic results on sequence preference are presented in Table 3. In fourteen out 
of the fourteen scenarios, ascending was the predominant choice. The percent of 
participants who preferred an ascending sequence ranged from 46.7% to 68.4% (out of 
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three choices). Based on this American sample, the preference for an ascending sequence 
was generalized to everyday life experiences across situations. We created binary 
variables for each scenario to indicate an ascending (or a descending) sequence was 
chosen or not, and averaged the binary variables for an ascending (or a descending) 
sequence across fourteen scenarios. The mean ascending correlated with mean 
descending at r(467) = -.93, p < .001. 
1. Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative 
situations? Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for negative 
scenarios (M = .60, SD = .34) was stronger than the mean ascending preference for 
positive scenarios (M = .57, SD = .36), t(468) = -1.95, p = .051, though the results did not 
quite reach a significant level.  
The importance ranking of positive anticipation didn’t correlate with the 
preference for an ascending sequence for positive experiences, r(440) = -.03, p = .516. 
The correlation between the importance ranking of dread and the preference for an 
ascending sequence for negative experiences approached significance, r(424) = -.09, p = 
.054, indicating a trend that people who found dread to be more important would prefer 
an ascending sequence for negative experiences.  
Is there a difference in the value placed on anticipation by valence? The 
negative anticipation was ranked as more important than the positive anticipation by a 
paired-sample t test that compared the rankings of the positive (M = 2.53, SD = .70) and 
negative anticipation (M = 1.99, SD = .81), t(403) = 10.97, p < .001.  
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Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean descending preference for positive 
scenarios (M = .40, SD = .36) was stronger than the mean descending preference for 
negative scenarios (M = .34, SD = .32), t(468) = 5.43, p < .001.  
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? The 
correlations between the binary variables for an ascending sequence among the fourteen 
scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(422) = .21, p < .001 to r(422) = .64, p < .001, 
with an average correlation of r = .40, which indicated a medium to large level of 
consistency. The correlations between the descending sequence binary variables among 
the fourteen scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(420) = .21, p < .001 to r(420) = 
.64, p < .001, with an average correlation of r = .40, which indicated a medium to large 
level of consistency. 
Discussion 
The valence effect appeared to be robust in Study 2, where the display order of 
valence was counterbalanced, the display order of the seven scenarios for each valence 
was randomized for each participant, two instead of three exemplars were used for each 
scenario, and three options (i.e., ascending sequence, descending sequence, neither) were 
presented.  
For the preference for an ascending sequence, the valence effect approached 
significance, t(468) = -1.95, p = .051, while in Study 1 it was significant, t(382) = 6.34, p 
< .001. It may be because that in Study 1, the negative scenario was presented right after 
the corresponding positive scenario for the same experience, while in Study 2, we 
presented seven positive (or negative) scenarios first, and then the corresponding seven 
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negative (or positive) scenarios. The contrast of valence for each experience may be more 
salient in Study 1 compared to Study 2.  
General Discussion 
In two studies, we examined sequence preference in everyday life experiences and 
life experience as a whole. We have found a valence effect and a cultural difference 
(between Americans and Indians) on sequence preference. Despite the cultural difference, 
the majority of Americans and Indians showed a preference for an ascending sequence 
for life experience as a whole. People have shown a medium to large level of individual 
consistency in their sequence preference. 
1. Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative 
situations? Prior research suggested that more people chose an ascending sequence for 
negative experiences such as headaches than positive experiences such as massages or 
sushi dinners, and more people chose a descending sequence for such positive 
experiences than for such negative experiences (see Table 3 in Frederick & Loewenstein, 
2008, Study 1a and 1b). However, such studies didn't aim to test for the valence effect 
and therefore didn’t isolate the valence factor. In the present research, we created 
symmetrical positive and negative scenarios that were different only in valence and 
isolated the valence factor. We found that people were more likely to prefer an ascending 
sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and that people were more 
likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences than negative experiences. 
A sizable percentage of people (e.g., 41% in Study 1) preferred an ascending sequence 
for negative experiences despite of the fact that such a sequence presented them with the 
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most negative experience first. The evolutionary standpoint suggests that the delay of the 
most negative experience, which may indicate the greatest danger, maximizes the chance 
of survival. The results suggest that the preference for an ascending sequence is stronger 
than the evolutionary instinct to delay the most negative experience.  
2. Is there a difference in sequence preference between Americans and Indians? 
We believe this was the first time that sequence preference was examined with a sample 
outside of the western culture. We recruited participants and contrasted their sequence 
preference with that of the Americans. We found significant cultural differences. 
Americans were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that 
Indians were more likely to prefer a descending sequence than Americans, even for the 
life experience taken as a whole, when the majority of Americans as well as Indians 
preferred an ascending sequence. 
The cultural difference suggests that being sensitive to each culture’s unique 
sequence preference may help to tailor experiences or products to appeal to the particular 
culture. For example, 63.8% Indians preferred a descending sequence for a positive trip, 
whereas 55.3% Americans preferred an ascending sequence for a positive trip. In order to 
attract more Indian customers to a positive trip, e.g., design an experience on a cruise trip, 
it may be more appealing to use a descending sequence to arrange the activities on the 
cruise. If the potential customers were Americans, it may be more appealing to use an 
ascending sequence to arrange the activities on the cruise. 
Prior research showed that the real-time evaluation of the end of an experience 
was significantly correlated with the retrospective global evaluation of the pleasant 
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experience with American samples (Frederickson & Kahneman, 1993), which suggested 
that, given the same pleasant experiences, an ascending sequence would be evaluated as a 
better experience than a descending sequence according to Americans. This discrepancy 
may be due to a difference of culture or a prospective versus retrospective evaluation of 
an experience. 
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? For the 
total sample, there are 91 possible pairings of two scenarios from the set of 14. The 
correlations were all positive. The individual’s sequence preference was consistent across 
domains. The consistency level across scenarios for an ascending sequence was r = .29 in 
Study 1 and r = .40 in Study 2; for a descending sequence was r = .33, in Study 1 and r = 
.40 in Study 2, indicating a medium to large level of consistency for sequence preference 
across scenarios. 
4. What is the sequence preference for life experience as a whole? We found a 
strong preference for the ascending life course in both Americans (54.7% ascending) and 
Indians (51% ascending).  
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) have shown that different elicitation 
procedures may produce different responses in sequence preference. For example, they 
showed that the preference for an ascending sequence documented with a choice task 
disappeared when using allocation or pricing tasks. Our studies used a choice task, the 
standard elicitation procedure for sequence preference, and thus caution should be 
exercised when generalizing the results to other elicitation procedures. There are a 
number of other limitations of the present research, including using only Mturk samples 
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and self report data without any real choices. 
Building on prior research, Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) noted three factors 
that favored an ascending sequence. 1) By saving the better outcomes for later, people 
increased the positive anticipation and decreased the dread (Berns, et al., 2006; 
Loewenstein, 1987). 2) People experienced a series of gains relative to the last outcome 
(Helson, 1964). 3) The respondents extended the presented sequences according to the 
trends. For example, the sequence (5, 6, 7) might have been projected as (5, 6, 7, 8...) and 
thus was preferred to (7, 6, 5), which might have been projected as (7, 6, 5, 4...), because 
they offered different totals. They also noted three factors that favored a descending 
sequence, including 1) the uncertainty about whether the later outcome would occur; 2) 
the opportunity cost of delaying the better outcomes; and 3) pure time preference (i.e., 
people cared less about outcomes that were more temporally remote).  
We discuss each of the motivations to prefer an ascending or a descending 
sequence noted in Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) in light of the valence and cultural 
effects. Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) have noted three motivations to prefer an 
ascending sequence. The first motivation is to increase positive anticipation and decrease 
dread. Is the valence effect or/and the cultural effect related to anticipation? We tested the 
relationship between the importance ranking of anticipation (out of anticipation, 
experience and memory) and the preference for an ascending sequence. On the individual 
level, the correlations between the anticipation preference and the ascending sequence 
preference were not significant, but in the predicted direction, that a person who values 
anticipation more would show a stronger preference for an ascending sequence. On a 
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group level, negative anticipation (dread) was rated as more important than positive 
anticipation. This finding is consistent with the position that anticipation importance may 
play a role in the predominance of ascending in the negative situation. There was no 
significant difference in the value placed on anticipation by culture. Hence this could not 
be used to account for Indian-American differences in ascending sequence preference. 
The second motivation to prefer an ascending sequence is to experience gains 
relative to the last outcome. This motivation applies for both positive and negative 
experiences. It is possible that people would perceive such gains (i.e., the difference 
between two consecutive elements in a sequence) to be larger for negative experiences 
compared to for positive experience due to negative potency (Baumeister et al., 2001; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001); the larger perceived gains relative to the last outcome in a 
negative experience (compared to a positive experience) leads people to show a stronger 
preference for an ascending for the negative experience (compared to positive 
experience). There is no obvious reason why Americans and Asian Indians would be 
different in this aspect. 
The third motivation to prefer an ascending sequence is that people extend the 
trends according to the existing sequence, and the extended trends based on an ascending 
sequence yields a higher total value (compared to the extended trends based on a 
descending sequence). The positive and negative experience can both be extended. For 
positive experiences, suppose the ascending sequence is (5, 6, 7), which will be extended 
to (5, 6, 7, 8); the descending sequence is (7, 6, 5), which will be extended to (7, 6, 5, 4). 
In this case, the total value of the extended ascending sequence is 26, and the total value 
of the extended descending sequence is 22. For negative experiences, suppose the 
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ascending sequence is (-7, -6, -5), which will be extended to (-7, -6, -5, -4); the 
descending sequence is (-5, -6, -7), which will be extended to (-5, -6, -7, -8). In this case, 
the total value for the extended ascending sequence is -22, and the total value of the 
extended descending sequence is -26. It seems that in both cases, the extended ascending 
sequence is up by 4 in total value compared to the descending sequence. However, this is 
based on the assumption, for any specific sequence, the numerical value equals the 
perceived value. If people perceive the negative to be more intense compared to the 
positive (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), then the extended elements 
of -4 (ascending) and -8 (descending) for the negative experiences would be perceived to 
be more intense compared to 4 (descending) and 8 (ascending) for the positive 
experiences. For example, at a 1.5 inflation rate, -4 and -8 will be perceived as -6 and -12. 
Then the difference between -4 and -8 would be perceived as larger compared to the 
difference between 8 and 4. If so, the difference in total value will be larger between the 
ascending and the descending for the negative experiences compared to positive 
experiences. Therefore, people should show a stronger preference for an ascending 
preference for negative experiences compared to for positive experiences. 
There may be a cultural difference in how people extend the trends. The literature 
has only noted the cultural difference between the East Asians and North Americans in 
terms of how they predict future trends. East Asians were more likely to predict cyclical 
trends (e.g., what has been going up will go down) compared to North Americans, and 
North Americans were more likely to predict linear trends (e.g., what has been going up 
will continue to go up) compared to East Asians (Ji, 2005). That is, based on a sequence 
of (5, 6, 7), East Asians may predict the reversal such as (5, 6, 7, 6, 5) rather than a 
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continuance of the sequence (5, 6, 7, 8, 9). The motivation to prefer an ascending 
sequence based on extended trends assumes that people predict linear trends, which may 
or may not be the case for Indians. There is no study on how Indians predict trends in 
comparison to Americans; it is possible that the two cultures predict trends differently, 
which relates to their cultural difference in sequence preference. If Indians, being a South 
Asian culture, resemble East Asians in this regard rather than North Americans, and thus 
predict reversals, this is consistent with the results that Indians show a weaker preference 
for an ascending sequence.  
Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) have noted three motivations to prefer a 
descending sequence. The first motivation is based on an uncertainty about whether the 
later outcome would occur, which applies to both the positive and the negative situations. 
In both positive and negative experiences, the later outcome may not occur. A preference 
for a descending sequence for a positive (or negative) experience indicates that the least 
positive (or most negative) element, which comes later, may not occur. A preference for 
an ascending sequence for a positive (or negative) experience indicates that the most 
positive (or least negative) element, which comes later, may not occur. Therefore, the 
motivation based on uncertainty favors a descending sequence for positive (or negative) 
experience.  
In terms of the valence difference, if anything, losing the most negative element 
(in the case of a descending sequence) and losing the least negative element (in the case 
of an ascending sequence) for a negative experience due to uncertainty may make a larger 
difference compared to losing the least positive element (in the case of a descending 
sequence) and losing the most positive element (in the case of an ascending sequence) for 
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a positive experience, due to negative potency (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001). Therefore, in consideration of the uncertainty factor, the difference 
between the ascending and the descending is larger in negative than in positive situations. 
Thus people should show a stronger preference for a descending sequence for a negative 
experience. It is possible that the two cultures differ in terms of perceived level of 
uncertainty. A culture that perceives a higher level of uncertainty should show a stronger 
preference for a descending sequence. If Indians perceive a higher level of uncertainty 
compared to Americans, this is consistent with Indians’ stronger preference for a 
descending sequence. 
The second motivation to prefer a descending sequence is based on the 
opportunity cost of delaying the better outcomes. This motivation is mostly related to 
sequences of monetary gains, because monetary gains can be invested and accumulate 
returns. The present research used everyday life experiences as domains to test the 
sequence preferences, and such everyday life experiences cannot be invested with 
monetary returns.  
The third motivation to prefer a descending sequence is temporal discounting. 
According to this motivation, the later outcome will be discounted; if the later outcome is 
of a higher value, it will be discounted more. For example, at the same discount rate of 
30%,  $10 will be discounted by $3, and $1 will only be discounted by $.3. Therefore, 
with temporal discounting, it is preferable to have a later outcome of a lower value, i.e., a 
descending sequence, compared to a later outcome of a higher value, i.e., an ascending 
sequence. The higher the discount rate is, the more the later outcome will be discounted. 
For example, $10 will be discounted by $3 based on a 30% discount rate, and will be 
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discounted by $6 based on a 60% discount rate. At a higher discount rate, it is even more 
preferable to arrange the element of a lower value to be the later outcome, i.e., a 
descending sequence. Therefore, there should be a stronger preference for a descending 
sequence at a higher discount rate. 
There is evidence that gains are discounted more than losses (e.g., Appelt, 
Hardisty & Weber, 2011). Based on the temporal discounting factor, people should show 
a stronger preference for a descending sequence for gains compared to losses. This is 
consistent with the valence effect that people show a stronger preference for a descending 
sequence for positive experiences compared to negative experiences, and could 
potentially explain the valence effect. 
Prior research shows that some Indians may show a longer term future 
orientation, which is consistent with a lower discount rate of future outcomes, compared 
to Americans (Sundberg, Poole & Tyler, 1983). Based on the logic stated above, the 
culture with a lower discount rate of future outcomes, i.e., Indians, should show a weaker 
preference for a descending sequence. This is inconsistent with the cultural difference 
that the Indians show a stronger preference for a descending sequence compared to North 
Americans. 
We discussed each motivation for an ascending or a descending sequence in light 
of the valence and cultural effects, and noted some possible mechanisms for the valence 
and cultural effects. Future research may investigate the potential mechanisms for the 
valence effect. For example, future studies could test if the discount rate mediates the 
relationship between valence and a preference for a descending sequence; that is, whether 
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the direct effect of valence on a descending sequence preference is reduced or becomes 
zero when the discount rate is controlled for.  
Future research may investigate the mechanisms of the cultural difference in 
sequence preference. For example, future studies may compare how Indians and 
Americans predict future trends, whether Indians predict cyclical trends more than 
Americans, and whether the way they predict trends mediates the relationship between 
culture and an ascending sequence preference. Future studies may also investigate how 
the two cultures compare in their perceived uncertainty of whether the later outcomes 
would occur, and if this factor mediates the relationship between culture and a 
descending sequence preference. 
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Footnotes 
1. We conducted another study to replicate the findings from Study 1 and examine if they 
can be generalized to behavioral tendency (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). 201 Mturk 
Americans (62.2% female) and 215 Mturk Indians (33.5% female) indicated the sequence 
in which they usually chose to organize their experiences.  
The ascending sequence was the predominant choice for Americans in seven out 
of fourteen scenarios. The descending sequence was the predominant choice for Indians 
in all fourteen scenarios. For ascending sequence, we found that (1) people were more 
likely to choose an ascending sequence for negative experiences (M = .30, SD = .29) than 
for positive experiences (M = .26, SD = .27), t(400) = -4.51, p < .001. (2) Americans (M 
= .29, SD = .25) were more likely to choose an ascending sequence than Indians (M = 
.27, SD = .27), but the cultural difference was not significant, t(399) = .50, p = .62. (3) 
The importance ranking of positive anticipation didn’t correlate with the tendency to 
choose an ascending sequence for positive experiences, r(359) = -.06, p = .298, and the 
importance ranking of dread didn’t correlate with the tendency to choose an ascending 
sequence for negative experiences, r(344) = .03, p = .571.  
For descending sequence, we found that (1) people were more likely to choose a 
descending sequence for positive experiences (M = .46, SD = .35) than for negative 
experiences (M = .32, SD = .31), t(400) = 10.64, p < .001, and (2) Indians (M = .50, SD = 
.29) were more likely to choose a descending sequence than Americans (M = .28, SD = 
.27), t(399) = -7.77, p < .001. The cultural difference for an ascending sequence only 
showed a right trend, and no significant results; but overall, the study replicated the 
results from Study 1 and suggested that the valence and cultural differences based on 
sequence preference were generalizable to behavioral tendency.  
2. The Indian samples in our studies might be less representative than the American 
samples because the former were limited to Indians who spoke English. 
3. We asked participants from Study 1 and its replication study to respond to the same 
sequence preference question for life experience as described in the method section of 
Study 1. Table 2 presents the aggregated results from the two studies. There is no 
counterpart behavioral tendency question for life experience. 
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Table 1. Sequence preference by valence and culture, N (%) 
(The category showing the largest number for each row is in bold face)   
Scenario Culture  Ascending Descending  Other Total  
Chi 
square: 
India vs 
American 
Positive 
meal 
Americans 72 (37.9) 35 (18.4) 83 (43.7) 190 (100) χ
2(2) = 
103.49, p 
< .001 Indians 80 (36.7) 126 (57.8) 12 (5.5) 218 (100) 
Total 152 (37.3) 161 (39.5) 95 (23.3) 408 (100)  
Negative 
meal 
Americans 78 (41.1) 51 (26.8) 60 (31.6) 189 (99.5) χ
2(2) = 
11.62,  p = 
.003 Indians 77 (35.3) 91 (41.7) 46 (21.1) 214 (98.2) 
Total 155 (38.0) 142 (34.8) 106 (26.0) 403 (98.8)  
Positive 
phone call 
Americans 86 (45.3) 69 (36.3) 33 (17.4) 188 (98.9) χ
2(2) = 
36.11,  p < 
.001 Indians 51 (23.4) 145 (66.5) 22 (10.1) 218 (100) 
Total 137 (33.6) 214 (52.5) 55 (13.5) 406 (99.5)  
Negative 
phone call 
Americans 107 (56.3) 48 (25.3) 35 (18.4) 190 (100) χ
2(2) = 
23.62, p < 
.001 Indians 70 (32.1) 88 (40.4) 58 (26.6) 216 (99.1) 
Total 177 (43.4) 136 (33.3) 93 (22.8) 406 (99.5)   
Positive 
project 
Americans 72 (37.9) 77 (40.5) 41 (21.6) 190 (100) χ
2(2) = 
23.82, p < 
.001 Indians 60 (27.5) 138 (63.3) 20 (9.1) 218 (100) 
Total 132 (32.4) 215 (52.7) 61 (15.0) 408 (100)  
Negative 
project 
Americans 98 (51.6) 53 (27.9) 37 (19.4) 188 (98.9) χ
2(2) = 
17.13, p < 
.001 Indians 72 (33.0) 100 (45.9) 43 (19.8) 215 (98.6) 
Total 170 (41.7) 153 (37.5) 80 (19.6) 403 (98.8)  
Positive 
trip 
Americans 105 (55.3) 40 (21.1) 45 (23.7) 190 (100) χ
2(3) = 
76.43, p < 
.001 Indians 61 (28.0) 139 (63.8) 18 (8.3) 218 (100) 
Total 166 (40.7) 179 (43.9) 63 (15.4) 408 (100)  
Negative 
trip 
Americans 108 (56.8) 35 (18.4) 46 (24.2) 189 (99.5) χ
2(2) = 
42.42, p < 
.001 Indians 70 (32.1) 106 (48.6) 41 (18.8) 217 (99.5) 
Total 178 (43.6) 141 (34.6) 87 (21.3) 406 (99.5)   
Positive 
visit 
people 
Americans 94 (49.5) 46 (24.2) 49 (25.8) 189 (99.5) χ
2(2) = 
50.84, p < 
.001 Indians 58 (26.6) 128 (58.7) 29 (13.4) 215 (98.6) 
Total 152 (37.3) 174 (42.6) 78 (19.1) 404 (99.0)  
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Negative 
visit 
people 
Americans 101 (53.2) 49 (25.8) 40 (21.1) 190 (100) χ
2(2) = 
28.12, p < 
.001 Indians 63 (28.9) 104 (47.7) 51 (23.4) 218 (100) 
Total 164 (40.2) 153 (37.5)  91 (22.3) 408 (100)  
Positive 
video clip 
Americans 80 (42.1) 49 (25.8) 61 (32.1) 190 (100) χ
2(2) = 
55.59, p < 
.001 Indians 60 (27.5) 132 (60.6) 24 (11) 216 (99.1) 
Total 140 (34.3) 181 (44.4) 85 (20.8) 406 (99.5)  
Negative 
video clip 
Americans 97 (51.1) 40 (21.1) 52 (27.4) 189 (99.5) χ
2(2) = 
36.32, p < 
.001 Indians 61 (28.0) 106 (48.6) 50 (22.9) 217 (99.5) 
Total 158 (38.7) 146 (35.8) 102 (25.0) 406 (99.5)   
Positive 
read article 
Americans 71 (37.4) 64 (33.7) 54 (28.4) 189 (99.5) χ
2(2) = 
45.13, p < 
.001 Indians 49 (22.5) 145 (66.5) 24 (11.1) 218 (100) 
Total 120 (29.4) 209 (51.2) 78 (19.1) 407 (99.8)  
Negative 
read article 
Americans 95 (50.0) 41 (21.6) 53 (27.9) 189 (99.5) χ
2(2) = 
33.90, p < 
.001 Indians 61 (28.0) 105 (48.2) 50 (22.9) 216 (99.1) 
Total 156 (38.2) 146 (35.8) 103 (25.2) 405 (99.3)   
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Table 2. Sequence preference for the life experience as a whole by culture, N (%) 
  Ascending Descending  Flat Peak in mid life 
Low in 
mid life Other Indifferent Total  
Americans 214 (54.7) 6 (1.5) 102 (26.1) 28 (7.2) 15 (3.8) 14 (3.6) 12 (3.1) 391 (100) 
Indians 221 (51.0) 21 (4.8) 109 (25.2) 44 (10.2) 22 (5.1) 3 (.7) 12 (2.8) 432 (99.8) 
		
92	
Table 3. Sequence preference by valence from Study 2, N (%) 
(The category showing the largest number for each row is in bold face)   
Domain Valence Ascending Descending  Neither Total  
Meal Positive 249 (53.1) 173 (36.9) 47 (10.0) 469 (100) Negative 251 (53.5) 185 (39.4) 33 (7.0) 469 (100) 
Phone call Positive 269 (57.4) 160 (34.1) 38 (8.1) 99.6 (100) Negative 280 (59.7) 163 (34.8) 26 (5.5) 469 (100) 
Project Positive 238 (50.7) 207 (44.1) 24 (5.1) 469 (100) Negative 282 (60.1) 157 (33.5) 30 (6.4) 469 (100) 
Trip Positive 301 (64.2) 144 (30.7) 23 (4.9) 468 (99.8) Negative 321 (68.4) 119 (25.4) 29 (6.2) 469 (100) 
Visit 
people 
Positive 297 (63.3) 130 (27.7) 40 (8.5) 467 (99.6) 
Negative 308 (65.7) 120 (25.6) 40 (8.5) 468 (99.8) 
Video clip Positive 228 (48.6) 208 (44.3) 32 (6.8) 468 (99.8) Negative 259 (55.2) 170 (36.2) 39 (8.3) 468 (99.8) 
Read 
article 
Positive 219 (46.7) 208 (44.3) 42 (9.0) 469 (100) 
Negative 243 (51.8) 185 (39.4) 40 (8.5) 468 (99.8) 
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Figure 1. The first five options each accompanied by a curve in the sequence preference 
question for the life experience as a whole. The remaining two options were: any other 
sequence, or indifferent to any sequence. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Cultural Differences Between East Asian and North American in Temporal 
Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter originally appeared as Gao, X. (2016). Cultural differences between East 
Asian and North American in temporal orientation. Review of General Psychology, 20(1), 
118-127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000070. Copyright © 2016 American 
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.   
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Abstract 
Based on East Asian and North American differences in holistic versus analytical 
cognitive processing style and the tendency to predict cyclical versus linear trends, this 
review proposes cultural differences in their temporal orientation. Building on prior 
research that has compared the cultural differences on past, present, and future 
orientation, this review hypothesizes that East Asians focus on the past and future more 
than North Americans, and North Americans focus on the present more than East Asians. 
It is suggested that in addition to a cultural difference in the focus on the 3 temporal 
domains, when moving from any past or future time point toward the present, North 
Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more than East Asians’ focus. I present 
evidence in three categories based on how temporal orientation is defined. Specially, I 
compare East Asians’ and North Americans’ focus on a temporal domain, their mental 
representation of a temporal domain and their subjective temporal distance to a temporal 
domain.  
Keywords: cultural difference, East Asian, temporal orientation, time orientation, time 
perspective  
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Cultural Differences Between East Asian and North American in Temporal Orientation  
How do East Asians and North Americans
1 differ in their temporal orientations? 
Guo, Ji, Spina, and Zhang (2012) have noted that temporal orientation describes the 
cognitive involvement in (e.g., Holman & Silver, 1998; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) and the 
tendency to experience emotional and behavioral reactions to the past, present, or future 
(Jones, Banicky, Lasane, & Pomare, 1996; Strathman & Joireman, 2005). Time 
perspective describes how the individual perceives the past and future at a given time 
(Frank, 1939; Lewin, 1942). In this review, I compare East Asians’ and North 
Americans’ tendency to perceive, represent, and focus on the past, present, and future. I 
use the terms temporal orientation or temporal focus to refer to the extent to which a 
culture attends to a specific temporal domain. This review (a) proposes theoretical bases 
and a hypothesis for East Asians’ and North Americans’ cultural differences in temporal 
orientations, and (b) analyzes and evaluates evidence in light of the hypothesis.  
Theoretical Bases and Hypothesis  
East Asian and North American cultures tend to have two distinct cognitive 
processing styles, the holistic and analytical, respectively (Nisbett, 1998; Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). East Asians, with a holistic cognitive 
style, pay attention to the context and the relationship between the object and its context, 
and prefer to explain and predict events based on this relationship. North Americans, with 
an analytical cognitive style, pay attention to the primary object, assign a category to a 
focal object, and prefer to explain and predict events based on the rules that apply to the 
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categories. These cognitive processes require East Asians to pay attention to the past and 
future to provide a context for the present, or the longer term past and future to provide a 
context for the shorter term past and future. North Americans, conversely, may pay 
primary attention to the present, or the shorter term past and future. The way that the 
Chinese and Americans denote dates is consistent with this view. The common practice 
in America is to specify a date in order of month, day, and year. In contrast, the practice 
in China is to specify a date in order of year, month, and day, in which the year and 
month provide a context for the day. This may suggest that in denoting time, the Chinese 
consider the broader context more important compared with Americans.  
When asked to predict the future based on existing trends, East Asians tend to 
predict more changes and cyclical trends, that is, the future will be the reverse of the 
present and past (e.g., what goes up will go down), whereas North Americans tend to 
predict more stability and linear trends, that is, the future will be stable and will keep 
going in the same direction (e.g., what goes up will keep going up; Ji, 2005; Ji, Nisbett, & 
Su, 2001). The way people predict changes may relate to their temporal orientation (Ji, 
Guo, Zhang, & Messervey, 2009). East Asians may predict cyclical trends because they 
take into account longer term time horizons, which prime them with more changes. North 
Americans may predict linear trends because they focus on shorter term time horizons, 
which prime them with more stability (Ji et al., 2009). In fact, when induced to take a 
shorter term temporal perspective, both European Canadians and Chinese predicted more 
stable patterns and fewer reversals (Guo & Ji, 2008).  
These theoretical views suggest that, compared with North Americans, East 
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Asians have a stronger temporal focus on the longer term time horizon, and compared 
with East Asians, North Americans have a stronger temporal focus on the shorter term 
time horizon. This review therefore hypothesizes that East Asians focus on the past and 
future more than North Americans, and North Americans focus on the present more than 
East Asians.  
Taking a step further, this review proposes a speculation about how the cultural 
difference in temporal orientation changes with respect to the present time point. The 
notion that East Asians have a stronger temporal focus on the longer term time horizon 
compared with North Americans, and North Americans have a stronger temporal focus 
on the shorter term time horizon compared with East Asians suggests the following (see 
Figure 1): First, when applied to the three extreme time points, the present, and the 
furthest past and future conceivable, (a) North Americans, compared with East Asians, 
show a stronger temporal focus on the present; and (b) East Asians, compared with North 
Americans, show a stronger temporal focus on the furthest past and future. Second, 
suppose the extent of temporal focus can be represented by a linear relationship. The 
dividing points are the two points of intersection, one in the past and the other in the 
future temporal domain. In the areas beyond the two dividing points, East Asians show a 
stronger temporal focus than North Americans; the difference between the two cultures’ 
temporal foci increases as the temporal orientation moves toward the further past or 
future. Within the area between the two dividing points, North Americans show a 
stronger temporal focus than East Asians; the difference between the two cultures’ 
temporal foci increases as the temporal orientation moves toward the present.  
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This review therefore speculates that, for the time points to the left of the past 
dividing point, East Asians show a stronger temporal focus than North Americans, and 
the cultural difference is largest for the furthest past, and decreases with movement 
toward the past dividing point, until there is no cultural difference at the past dividing 
point. Starting from the past dividing point and moving toward the present, North 
Americans show a stronger temporal focus compared with East Asians, and the cultural 
difference increases and becomes the largest at the present point. In other words, when 
moving from any past time point toward the present, North Americans’ focus grows more 
than East Asians’ focus. The pattern for the future resembles that of the past.  
To test this speculation, studies would ideally sample multiple time points in past 
or/and future domains as well as the present. Such studies are very limited in number. 
Most studies only include one representation for the past or future. These representations 
are likely to be time points that fall outside of the two dividing points for two reasons. 
First, the area between could be quite small compared with the area outside of the two 
dividing points. Second, the time points outside of the two dividing points are more 
representative of the past or future. Therefore, such studies are likely to find that East 
Asians show a stronger focus on the past or future compared with North Americans.  
Analysis of Evidence  
I present studies in three categories based on how temporal orientation or time 
perspective is defined and operationalized and compare cultural differences on each:  
1. To what extent do East Asians and North Americans focus on each temporal 
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domain?  
2. How good is their mental representation of a particular temporal domain?  
3. How “far away” does this temporal domain feel to them?  
I present evidence on the past and future temporal domains in two separate 
sections. I present evidence on the present temporal domain along with either the past or 
future section because the present orientation is often compared with the past or future 
orientation in the same studies.  
Cultural Differences in Past Orientation  
Prior research has pointed out that East Asian countries have a stronger past 
orientation compared with North Americans (Block, Buggie, & Matsui, 1996; Doob, 
1971; Guo et al., 2012; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Ko & Gentry, 1991; Pitta, Fung, 
& Isberg, 1999; Rojas-Méndez, Davies, Omer, Chetthamrongchai, & Madran, 2002; 
Spadone, 1992; Yau, 1988). I present evidence in three categories.  
To what extent do East Asians and North Americans focus on the past?
2 The 
proposed cultural differences are reflected in how people explain events. Based in the 
United States, a Chinese-language newspaper tended to explain assassination based on 
the history of the assailant, whereas the U.S.-based English-language newspaper tended 
to explain assassination based on the personal attributes of the assailant (Morris & Peng, 
1994). This suggests that the Chinese explain events with information from the past, 
whereas Americans explain events with information from the present. The Chinese and 
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European Canadians were asked to indicate how relevant each piece of information was 
to solving a theft crime (Ji et al., 2009). The information pieces differed in their temporal 
focus, representing longer term past (e.g., 3 years ago), shorter term past (e.g., 2 weeks 
ago), and present (e.g., currently). The Chinese considered information with a past 
temporal focus as more relevant to the case than Canadians did. The cultural difference 
on present temporal focus did not reach significance. The general trend suggests that, as 
moving from longer term past toward the present, Canadians’ focus on the temporal 
domain increased more than that of the Chinese.  
Compared with North Americans, East Asians tend to use the past to direct 
behaviors. Asian Americans showed a stronger past focus than Anglo-Americans, 
whereas Anglo-Americans showed a stronger present focus than did Asian Americans 
when considering whether to buy an ice cream cone (Briley & Aaker, 2007). The Chinese 
wrote down more reflections based upon memories than European Americans did, such 
as “I learned that practice makes perfection” (Q. Wang & Conway, 2004). Chinese 
teachers were more likely to discuss students’ past mistakes in order to improve their 
future performances than American teachers did (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). In addition, 
it has been proposed that marketing should connect products with past events 
(Brodowsky, Granitz, & Anderson, 2008) or its history (Spears, Lin, & Mowen, 2000) for 
Asian cultures. Compared with Americans, the Chinese were less likely to switch to a 
new brand if they were satisfied with the product in the past (Brislin & Kim, 2003; Yau, 
1988), or to try new products in general (Legohérel, Daucé, Hsu, & Ranchhold, 2009). 
This is considered less conclusive evidence because connection with the past is not the 
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only possible explanation for whether people switch brands; other factors, including 
variety seeking (e.g., Berlyne, 1970), are alternative explanations.  
The past is more integrated with the self for East Asians than for North 
Americans. For Asian Americans, higher levels of well-being were associated with, and 
resulted from more positive present and past self-ratings. For European Americans, 
higher levels of well-being were only associated with, and resulted from more positive 
present self-ratings, but not more positive past self-ratings (Kim et al., 2012).  
There is evidence that East Asians consider the past to be more important in their 
lives compared with North Americans, whereas North Americans consider the present to 
be more important in their lives compared with East Asians. Levinson and Peng (2007) 
asked the Chinese and Americans to estimate the present value of antique objects, for 
example, an antique chair, given their past value. The Chinese placed a higher value on 
antique objects. This study presents an exception in which Asian Americans’ responses 
resemble Americans rather than the Chinese. In an unpublished study, Gao and Rozin 
(2014) recruited Americans and Chinese of comparable age, gender distribution, and 
years of education, and asked them to rank, in a positive and a negative hedonic context 
respectively, how important anticipation, experience, and memory were in their lives. 
The Chinese gave memory a higher ranking than Americans, whereas Americans gave 
experience a higher ranking than the Chinese.  
East Asians may like to think about the past more, whereas North Americans may 
like to think about the present more. Gao and Rozin (2014) asked Chinese and Americans 
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which they liked to think about more—the past, present, or future. Most Chinese ranked 
the past as the second, whereas most Americans ranked the past as the third, though the 
average ranking for the Chinese and Americans was not significantly different. Note that 
this does not suggest that the Chinese actually do think about the past more than 
Americans. The Chinese and Americans estimated the percentages of past, present, and 
future thoughts they had. The Chinese (24.2%) and Americans (26.5%) attributed similar 
percentages to the past. Americans reported liking to think about the present more than 
the Chinese, but the Chinese (44.8%) and Americans (42.5%) reported similar 
percentages of present thoughts.  
In sum, East Asians focus more on the past compared with North Americans. 
Specifically, East Asians consider the past as more relevant for explaining events (Ji et 
al., 2009), directing behaviors (Briley & Aaker, 2007; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992; Q. 
Wang & Conway, 2004), and self-evaluation (Kim et al., 2012). Evidence also suggests 
that East Asians consider the past or memory as more important and like to think about 
the past more compared with North Americans, though the evidence comes mainly from 
one unpublished study (Gao & Rozin, 2014). For the hypothesis that North Americans 
focus more on the present compared with East Asians, the evidence is less conclusive (Ji 
et al., 2009), though not nonexistent (Briley & Aaker, 2007; Gao & Rozin, 2014). Most 
evidence comes from studies that had only one representation for the past domain and 
supported the hypothesis. One study sampled multiple time points in the past temporal 
domain and showed that, moving from the longer term past toward the present, 
Canadians’ focus on the temporal domain increased more than that of the Chinese, which 
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supported the speculation (Ji et al., 2009). Most evidence comes from a comparison 
between Chinese and Americans. Additional research is needed to sample multiple time 
points in the past domain and cover more populations from East Asia and North America.  
How good is East Asians’ and North Americans’ mental representation of the 
past? Briley (2009) has proposed that East Asians’ mental representations of the past and 
future tend to be low-level construals that are more concrete and contextual, and North 
Americans’ mental representations of the past and future tend to be high-level construals 
that are more schematic and decontextualized (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Nussbaum, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2003).  
This may relate to the fact that East Asian cultures tend to be interdependent and 
North American cultures tend to be independent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Interdependent cultures tend to have a prevention focus that emphasizes security needs, 
whereas independent cultures tend to have a promotion focus that emphasizes growth 
needs. The prevention focus fosters local, low-level construals because careful processing 
of details is needed to fulfill security needs. The promotion focus fosters global, high-
level construals because going beyond the local information is needed in order to achieve 
growth (Förster & Higgins, 2005; A. Y. Lee, Keller, & Sternthal, 2010). In addition, in 
social contexts, interdependent culture needs to pay close attention to the relationship 
between the self and others, which requires people to construct the self and others in a 
concrete and specific way rather than abstract and general (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 
2001; Morris & Peng, 1994).  
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Some empirical evidence suggests that East Asians’ memories tend to be more 
accurate and complete than North Americans. The theft crime study by Ji et al. (2009) 
asked Chinese and European Canadians to freely recall the list of information provided to 
them. The Chinese were more accurate in reporting the information about the past than 
the Canadians were (Guo et al., 2012). In Ji et al. (2009), the Chinese and European 
Canadian students recalled their first day of class at the end of the same day and 2 weeks 
later. Canadians reported slightly more information after the first day of class (though the 
result did not reach significance); the Chinese reported more information than did 
Canadians 2 weeks later. This indicates that Chinese remember the past better than 
Canadians do, which supported the hypothesis. This may further suggest that the Chinese 
remember the longer term past better than Canadians do, and Canadians remember the 
shorter term past better than the Chinese do, which supported the speculation (Ji et al., 
2009).  
On the other hand, there is evidence that North Americans tend to report more 
details for episodic and autobiographical memories compared with East Asians. European 
Americans reported more episodic details when describing past and future events than 
East Asians, but both cultures reported a similar amount of nonepisodic details (Wang, 
Hou, Tang, & Wiprovnick, 2011). North American adults have an earlier age of first 
autobiographical memory and more detailed autobiographical memories of childhood 
than East Asian adults do (Leichtman, Wang, & Pillemer, 2003). These may be related to 
the fact that European American mothers usually engage in high-elaborative conversation 
and scaffold children in reconstructing detailed narratives of the past (Wang et al., 2011), 
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and that North American cultures emphasize the role of the self and encourage children to 
construct stories about themselves (McAdams, 2008).  
In sum, with the exception of episodic and autobiographical memory details, East 
Asians seem to have more accurate and complete representations of the past. Further, 
there is a trend that East Asians remember the longer term past better than North 
Americans, and North Americans remember the shorter term past better than East Asians, 
which supported the speculation. Samples included in the comparison consist only of 
European Canadians and the Chinese. Further research is needed to cover more 
subgroups within East Asian and North American cultures.  
How “far away” does the past feel to East Asians and North Americans? 
Construal level theory posits that a low-level construal that is concrete and specific is 
associated with a proximal temporal distance, whereas a high-level construal that is 
abstract and general is associated with a distal temporal distance (Liberman & Trope, 
1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003). If East Asians’ mental representations of the past and 
future are more concrete and specific than North Americans’, then East Asians may feel 
temporally closer to the past and future.  
Empirical evidence supports this proposition. A specific time point (e.g., this 
month last year) or an event (e.g., one final exam) in the past felt closer to the Chinese 
than to the European Canadians (Ji et al., 2009). Past proud or embarrassing events felt 
closer to the Japanese than Canadians (Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005). I did not 
find studies that sampled multiple time points in the past, which could be a direction for 
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future research.  
Cultural Differences in Future Orientation  
Prior research has shown that East Asians have a stronger temporal focus on the 
long-term future than North Americans (e.g., Briley, 2009; Brislin & Kim, 2003; 
Hofstede, 2001; Ji et al., 2009; Li, 1999; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). As 
with the analysis of the past, I present the evidence in three categories.  
To what extent do East Asians and North Americans focus on the future? 
East Asians in the United States (including Chinese, Korean, and Japanese) imagined the 
response to a future event to last longer than European Americans did (S. Lee, Lee, & 
Kern, 2011), which suggests that East Asians perceive the consequences to be greater for 
given future events and are more connected with future outcomes compared with North 
Americans. Japanese and Americans listed as many consequences as they could think of 
for converting an area to a national park and wildlife preserve. The responses were coded 
into direct consequences that “immediately follow the critical event in time and/or 
location,” and indirect consequences that were “relatively far away from the critical even 
in time and/or location.” Americans listed more direct consequences than the Japanese, 
whereas the Japanese listed more indirect consequences than Americans (Maddux & 
Yuki, 2006). This suggests that East Asians may focus on the longer term future 
consequences more than North Americans, and North Americans may focus on the 
shorter term future consequences more than East Asians, which supports the speculation. 
Asian Americans (50% East Asian) and European Americans were asked to indicate, 
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with respect to a game of pool, how much a shot would affect the person who takes the 
next shot, the third and the sixth shot after the focal shot, respectively, and how much it 
would affect the overall outcome. Both cultures indicated that the critical shot had a 
bigger effect on the closer shots (shorter term) compared with those that were further 
away (longer term). European Americans indicated that the critical shot affected the next 
shot (shorter term future) more so than Asian Americans, whereas Asian Americans 
indicated that the critical shot affected the sixth shot (longer term future) more so than 
European Americans. European Americans’ estimation of future consequences, moving 
from shorter term to longer term future, decreased more than that of Asian Americans, 
which supports the speculation (Maddux & Yuki, 2006). Hofstede’s (2001) Long-term 
Orientation Scale puts future long-term, past, and present temporal orientation on one 
single dimension (it uses “long term” to refer to future long-term orientation, and “short 
term” to refer to past and present orientation), and does not measure temporal domains 
directly (persistence, ordering relationships by status and observing this order, thrift, and 
having a sense of shame are positively related to the long-term orientation, and personal 
steadiness and stability, protecting “face,” respect for tradition, and reciprocation of 
greetings, favors, and gifts are negatively related to long-term orientation), which may 
make the results difficult to interpret. However, results from this scale showed that East 
Asians countries had high scores on the Long-term Orientation Scale, whereas North 
American countries had low scores.  
Out of anticipation, experience, and memory, the Chinese and Americans did not 
rank the importance of anticipation significantly differently. However, there was a trend 
		
109	
that the Chinese ranked positive future (anticipation) as more important than Americans, 
and Americans ranked negative future (dread) as more important than the Chinese (Gao 
& Rozin, 2014). This suggests an interesting possibility that temporal focus may depend 
on the valence of the context. Chinese reported liking to think about the future the most 
out of past, present, and future (71.43% future), whereas only 43.33% Americans 
reported liking to think about the future the most. The two cultures reported similar 
percentages of actual future thoughts (31.0%; Gao & Rozin, 2014).  
In sum, three studies support the hypothesis that East Asians focus more on future 
consequences compared with North Americans (S. Lee et al., 2011; Maddux & Yuki, 
2006). Further, two studies sampled multiple time points in the future temporal domain 
and supported the speculation (Maddux & Yuki, 2006). There is also evidence that East 
Asians consider anticipation as more important and would like to think about the future 
more than North Americans. However, this evidence comes from one single unpublished 
study, with participants exclusively from China and United States (Gao & Rozin, 2014). 
Additional studies are needed to provide more conclusive evidence and cover more 
population in the two cultural groups.  
How good is East Asians’ and North Americans’ mental representation of the 
future? I discussed the proposition that East Asians have a low-level construal of the 
future, whereas North Americans have a high-level construal of the future and provided a 
theoretical basis for this in the section on past orientation (Briley, 2009). I did not find 
empirical evidence for this proposition. However, there is evidence suggesting that East 
Asians feel temporally closer to the future compared with North Americans (see next 
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section “How ‘far away’ does the future feel to East Asians and North Americans?”), 
which is consistent with the view that East Asians have a more concrete and contextual 
mental representation of the future compared with North Americans, according to 
construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003).  
How “far away” does the future feel to East Asians and North Americans? 
East Asians in the United States (including Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) imagined a 
given future event taking place sooner than European Americans (S. Lee et al., 2011), 
which suggests that East Asians felt temporally closer to the future. In an unpublished 
study, Gao and Rozin (2014) asked the Chinese and Americans to indicate the subjective 
temporal distance from the present to 3 months and from the present to 20 months into 
the future. Americans perceived the shorter term future (i.e., 3 months) as closer 
compared with the Chinese, whereas the Chinese perceived the longer term future (i.e., 
20 months) as closer compared with Americans. This suggests that East Asians perceive a 
longer term future as closer compared with North Americans, and North Americans 
perceive a shorter term future as closer compared with East Asians, which supports the 
speculation.  
People who feel closer to the future would discount future outcomes less 
(Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). Do East Asians discount future outcomes 
less than North Americans? Some empirical evidence suggests that the answer is “yes.” 
For example, Asians Americans tend to have higher educational attainments compared 
with White Americans (Sue & Okazaki, 2009). Compared with Americans and 
Canadians, the Chinese and the Japanese discount the future less in financial planning 
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(e.g., save more, retire with more wealth) and health maintenance (e.g., practice safer sex, 
smoke less, less obese; M. K. Chen, 2013). However, studies on intertemporal choices 
yield mixed results. Some studies suggest that Asians discount delayed outcomes less so 
than Westerners. Asian Americans, when primed with their Asian identity, made more 
patient choices (Benjamin, Choi, & Strickland, 2010). Bicultural Singaporeans, when 
primed with Western (vs. Singaporean) icons, showed less patience (H. Chen, Ng, & 
Rao, 2005). Americans discounted the delayed outcomes more steeply than the Japanese 
for both monetary gains and losses (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Takahashi et al., 
2009). However, other studies suggest that East Asians and North Americans discount 
delayed outcomes to similar degrees. Americans and Chinese discounted delayed rewards 
to a similar extent (Du et al., 2002). Tan and Johnson (1996) reported no differences in 
the temporal discounting rate between Canadian and Chinese undergraduates. A study 
that sampled 45 countries found that a comparable proportion of undergraduates of Anglo 
and East Asian descent—around 66% to 70%—chose to wait for a delayed reward (M. 
Wang, Rieger, & Hens, 2016). Studies on intertemporal choices may yield mixed results 
because shorter and longer term future times were not considered separately.  
In sum, evidence indicates that East Asians perceive the future as closer compared 
with North Americans (S. Lee et al., 2011). It is also suggested that North Americans 
perceive a shorter term future as closer and East Asians perceive a longer term future as 
closer (Gao & Rozin, 2014), which supports the speculation. Although the studies on 
intertemporal choices contain mixed results, studies within real-life contexts, such as 
education, finance, health, consistently suggest that East Asians discount future outcomes 
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less so than North Americans, which indicates that East Asians feel temporally closer to 
the future.  
Discussion  
Based on the cultural differences on holistic versus analytical cognitive 
processing style, and cyclical versus linear prediction trends, this review hypothesizes 
that East Asians focus on the past and future more than North Americans, whereas North 
Americans focus on the present more than East Asians, and analyzes evidence in three 
categories based on the operationalization of temporal orientation. Overall, available 
evidence supports the hypothesis. This review also proposes a speculation about how the 
cultural difference in temporal orientation changes with respect to the present time point, 
which is that when moving from any past or future time point toward the present, North 
Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more than East Asians’ focus (see 
Figure 1). Only studies that sample more than one time point in the past or future 
temporal domain can test this speculation. Though very limited in number, the available 
evidence consistently supports the speculation.  
Connections With Prior Literature  
Some articles point out that East Asians may have a stronger past and future 
orientation compared with North Americans (e.g., Briley, 2009; Ji et al., 2009; there is a 
significant amount of literature suggesting that East Asians have a stronger past 
orientation, e.g., Block et al., 1996; Brislin & Kim, 2003; Burkhardt, 1955; Doob, 1971; 
Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Ko & Gentry, 1991; 
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Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan, & Wassmann, 2012; Pitta et al., 1999; Rojas-Méndez et al., 
2002; Spadone, 1992; Spears et al., 2000; Yau, 1988; Zuo, 2001). Literature also suggests 
that North Americans have a stronger present orientation compared with East Asians 
(e.g., Brislin & Kim, 2003; Cho, Kwon, Gentry, Jun, & Kropp, 1999; Ji et al., 2009; 
Sundberg, Poole, & Tyler, 1983; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).  
Some literature distinguishes short- and long-term past and future, and suggests 
that East Asians have a stronger long-term orientation (though they mostly refer to long-
term future orientation; e.g., Briley, 2009; Brislin & Kim, 2003; Hofstede, 2001; Li, 
1999; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998) and North Americans have a stronger 
short-term orientation (e.g., Brislin & Kim, 2003; Hofstede, 2001). Such studies take one 
step further and break the past or future into two domains: short term and long term. This 
review proposes a hypothesis regarding the cultural differences on three temporal 
domains, and further proposes a speculation based on the theoretical views by treating the 
past, present, and future as a continuous temporal dimension, and differentiates 
predictions based on temporal distance with respect to the present.  
Some research argues that East Asians have a past orientation and North 
Americans have a future orientation (Brislin & Kim, 2003; Cho et al., 1999; Graham, 
1981; Guo et al., 2012; Hall, 1976; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Spears et al., 2000; 
Yau, 1988). This may come from the literature on temporal asymmetry, which suggests 
that North Americans value the future more than the past, whereas East Asians value the 
past more than the future (Guo et al., 2012). These statements hold true when comparing 
the past and future temporal orientation within the same culture, but should not be taken 
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as a comparison for the same temporal orientation between the two cultures. For 
example, although there is evidence that North Americans have a stronger focus on the 
future than the past, evidence does not suggest that North Americans have a stronger 
focus on the future compared with East Asians.  
Cultural Groups  
This review compares temporal orientations between East Asians and North 
Americans. East Asian samples were Chinese in China, Japanese in Japan, and Korean 
nationals, as well as East Asians (Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) in the United States or 
Asian Americans in the United States. North American samples were European 
Americans or Americans in the United States, European Canadians or Canadians in 
Canada, or Anglo-Americans.  
East Asians or Asian Americans in the United States resemble East Asians living 
in East Asian countries in their cultural difference with North Americans (except for the 
Levinson & Peng, 2007 study, in which Caucasian and Asian Americans from United 
States did not show a significant difference). This suggests that cultural heritage has a 
stronger influence on the tendency for temporal orientation than the country of residence. 
In addition, even though both Asian Americans and Caucasians are likely to have English 
as their native language, there are cultural differences between these two groups (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2012). When East Asians or Asian Americans in the United States used 
English to complete the studies, the cultural difference remains (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; S. 
Lee et al., 2011). These suggest that language is unlikely to explain the cultural 
		
115	
difference (this contradicts the view in M. K. Chen, 2013).  
It is possible that the cultural differences between East Asians and North 
Americans, with most evidence coming from China, United States and Canada, is 
because of the fact that China has a much longer history. Are the differences in temporal 
orientation a cultural difference or a difference because of the length of history? Greece, 
a Western culture with a much longer history, resembles the patterns found in North 
America rather than China. Though I do not have direct empirical evidence on Greek 
participants’ temporal orientation, Greeks tend to predict linear changes (Fisher, 1964), 
which, theoretically, is consistent with a present orientation. In addition, M. K. Chen 
(2013) suggests that Greece saves less than East Asian countries, which resembles the 
tendency of North Americans.  
The majority of evidence for East Asia, especially for past orientation, comes 
from the Chinese, which raises the question of whether the conclusions apply to East 
Asians in general. Though limited in numbers, the studies that sampled other East Asian 
cultures, including the Japanese (Ross et al., 2005) and East Asian Americans (Briley & 
Aaker, 2007; Kim et al., 2012) for past orientation, and Korean and the Japanese (S. Lee 
et al., 2011; Maddux & Yuki, 2006) for future orientation, consistently show similar 
findings as the Chinese.  
The observed temporal orientation of North Americans may be generalizable to 
Westerners. First, research has shown similar psychological tendencies among cultures 
with a Confucian influence, which include China, Japan, Korea, and so forth, compared 
		
116	
with cultures with an Aristotelian/Judeo-Christian heritage, which include the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 
1998; Maddux & Yuki, 2006; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001). Second, 
the theoretical basis for the proposed cultural differences between East Asians and North 
Americans on temporal orientation, including an analytical cognitive processing style 
(Nisbett, 1998; Nisbet et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999) and a linear way of predicting 
change (Ji, 2005; Ji et al., 2001), apply to Westerners in general. Third, empirical studies 
show that Westerners in general resemble North Americans in temporal orientation. 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) found that Confucian cultures tended to score 
higher on longer term planning and Western cultures tended to score higher on shorter 
term planning. Anglo-Australians resemble European Americans in that they discount 
long-term rewards more than the Chinese. For example, Chinese students tended to 
believe that effort would contribute to their academic success (Stevenson & Stigler, 
1992) and would put more effort into their academic work compared with Anglo-
Australian and Euro-American students did (Rosenthal & Feldman, 1991).  
Within-Cultural Differences  
For most significant East–West differences, more of the variation is within as 
opposed to between cultures (Rozin, 2003). Talhelm et al. (2014) showed that even 
within China, there are regional differences between north and south. Specifically, 
northern Chinese are more independent and analytical in thinking than southern Chinese. 
This suggests that northern Chinese may resemble North Americans in temporal 
orientation.  
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It has been suggested that wealth and education lead to patience (Becker & 
Mulligan, 1997; M. Wang et al., 2016; however, research on the relationship between 
wealth and discount rates in intertemporal choices yields mixed results, see Anderson, 
Dietz, Gordon, & Klawitter, 2004; Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002; Hausman, 1979; 
Kirby et al., 2002; Lawrance, 1991; Mink, 1993; M. Wang et al., 2016). The 
modernization hypothesis suggests that people become more individualistic and engage 
in more analytic thinking as they become wealthier (Greenfield, 2009; Talhelm et al., 
2014). This suggests that the wealthier regions within East Asia or North America may 
show temporal orientation more characteristic of North Americans compared with 
regions that are less wealthy.  
Nowadays young people from Eastern cultures have more access to Western 
culture as a result of globalization and may show features that traditionally represent 
Western cultures. For example, in China and Japan, the power of collectivism declined 
among young people (Naito & Gielen, 2005; Stevenson & Zusho, 2002). Even within 
North America, younger Americans appear to be more individualistic than older 
Americans (Heine, 2012). Thus, compared with older adults, young people’s temporal 
orientation in both cultures may be more similar to North Americans, whereas the elderly 
may be more characteristic of East Asians. Socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) provides a competing prediction. The theory argues that as 
people perceive their future to be more limited, which is often associated with aging, 
people have a shorter term orientation in emotional regulation and prioritize emotional 
goals that bring shorter term satisfaction. The theory suggests that as people age, they 
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may resemble North American in temporal orientation, at least in the domain of 
emotional regulation. The results on how aging relates to discount rate in intertemporal 
choice are mixed. Some studies show that, as age increases, people discount delayed 
rewards less steeply (Du et al., 2002; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Others show that 
middle-aged people discount less than both younger and older people (Read & Read, 
2004). It is possible that the relationship between age and temporal orientation depends 
on other factors.  
Limitations  
This review does not discuss cultural differences surrounding other topics related 
to time, such as polychronicity (i.e., preference for doing multiple things at a time) and 
monochronicity (i.e., preference for doing one thing at a time), event time (i.e., go with 
natural flow of events) and clock time (i.e., adhere to schedules), pace of life (i.e., speed 
of doing everyday activities), time use (i.e., how much time people spend on various 
activities), and so forth, because these topics will warrant separate reviews (see Fulmer, 
Crosby, & Gelfand, 2014, for a review).  
On the topic of temporal orientation, this review focuses on comparing the two 
cultural groups in terms of the same temporal domain, and does not compare the temporal 
orientation for the past, present, and future within the same culture. First, the temporal 
orientation for the past and future may not be symmetrical for the same culture. The 
literature of temporal asymmetry shows that East Asians focus more on the past than the 
future (Guo et al., 2012), whereas North Americans focus more on the future than the 
		
119	
past (Graham, 1981; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Spears et al., 2000; Specter & 
Ferrari, 2000). Second, both cultures may focus more on the present than the past or 
future (e.g., Briley & Aaker, 2007; Ji et al., 2009, Study 1; Maddux & Yuki, 2006, Study 
1), but this may not be the case for all studies (e.g., Ji et al., 2009, Study 2). Figure 1 
should be used with these considerations in mind.  
Future Directions  
This review brings out new directions to study temporal orientation. One 
possibility is to examine temporal focus in the context of positive, neutral, and negative 
valenced events. Most research on temporal orientation so far has downplayed the factor 
of valence. Gao and Rozin (2014) have results indicating that positive and negative 
contexts seem to prompt different importance rankings for the future. It may be 
interesting to study psychological temporal domains. The time points that people 
naturally think of may reflect the psychological past, present, and future rather than the 
physically defined domains. Technically, any time point in the past, even one second ago, 
is the past, but people may not perceive it to be the past. Psychologically, people may 
naturally group time points together, which forms three temporal domains. The two 
dividing points, which delineate the boundary of when the two cultures differ in temporal 
orientation, may represent, psychologically, how people divide time.  
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Footnotes 
1 For the purpose of this review, I use “North American” to describe American and 
Canadian cultures. Mexican cultures may warrant separate consideration.  
2 Sircova et al. (2015) administered the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory with five 
temporal orientations—past positive, past negative, present hedonistic, present fatalistic, 
and future—to 24 countries, which included China, Japan, and the United States. 
However, the psychometrics for East Asian samples were not sufficiently sound for the 
purpose of making cross-cultural comparisons.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present research examined the factors that affected prospection, in the 
domains of future time perception, sequence preference for future experience and future 
temporal orientation.  
Valence affected prospection across the three domains. In Chapter 1, valence 
affected future time perception. A positive future experience felt further away compared 
to a negative future experience. The duration of a negative future experience felt longer 
compared to the duration of a positive future experience. In Chapter 2, there was a 
stronger preference in both American and Asian Indian cultures for an ascending 
sequence for negative future experiences compared to for positive future experiences. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, the importance ranking of anticipation, experience and memory was 
different by valence. In chapter 2, both Indians and Americans rated anticipation as more 
important for negative events. In chapter 3, there was a trend that the Chinese ranked 
positive future (anticipation) as more important than Americans, and Americans ranked 
negative future (dread) as more important than the Chinese (Gao & Rozin, 2014). These 
findings suggest that valence may be a factor that affects prospection across domains and 
framings of events.   
The mechanism through which valence affects prospection may differ depending 
on the specific aspect of prospection (e.g., future time perception, sequence preference 
for future experience, future temporal orientation) or it may be consistent across the 
various aspects of prospection. One major difference between the positive and the 
negative is that the negative is more intense than the positive (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
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Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Of course, with this in mind, it is 
possible to equate the intensity of any pair of negative and positive events.  Does 
intensity explain the valence effect in the present research? 
Bilgin and LeBoeuf (2010) have noted that both the valence effect and the 
intensity effect may be at work to contribute to the difference in time perception between 
positive and negative events (Chapter 1). Chapter 1 only tested the valence effect and 
didn’t test the effect of intensity, but the results suggest that, the valence effect is stronger 
than the intensity effect. Job scenario’s positive version (M = 31.80) was rated as more 
intense than the negative version (M = -16.96), and the lawsuit scenario’s negative 
version (M = -34.89) was rated as more intense than the positive version (M = 10.90). 
However, both the job and the lawsuit scenarios showed the same effect, that the positive 
future experiences felt further away than the negative ones, and that the negative future 
experiences felt longer in duration than the positive ones. This suggests that the 
difference between the positive and negative in Experiment 1 was due to a valence effect, 
rather than an intensity effect. However, this issue can only be settled clearly by future 
research. 
The intensity account of the valence effect may be consistent with the stronger 
preference for an ascending sequence in negative situations compared to positive 
situations in Chapter 2, with the assumption that people have a stronger preference for an 
ascending sequence for more intense situations. Future research may explore and 
examine the explanations of why valence affects prospection. For example, does the 
negative context prompt different responses from the positive context because people pay 
		
136	
more attention to the negative context? Is it possible that people process the positive and 
negative situations in different ways because they serve different purposes? People may 
be more likely to choose positive experiences because of their hedonic value, but they are 
less likely to choose negative experiences for this reason. They are more likely to choose 
negative experiences for a practical purpose and endure the negative sensation associated 
with the experience (compared to positive experiences). The difference in the motivation 
to choose positive versus negative experiences may prompt people to place different 
values on the different components of positive or negative experiences. For example, 
people may value the ending of a negative experience, which signifies the outcome of an 
experience, more than the ending of a positive experience. This may lead to different 
responses in negative contexts of prospection than positive ones. 
Culture has been shown to affect prospection. Chapter 2 has shown a significant 
cultural difference between the Americans and Asian Indians in sequence preference. 
Americans showed a stronger preference for an ascending sequence compared to Indians, 
whereas Indians showed a stronger preference for a descending sequence compared to 
Americans. Chapter 3 noted the cultural difference between East Asians and North 
Americans in their temporal orientation. East Asians showed a stronger focus on the 
longer term horizons compared to North Americans, whereas North Americans showed a 
stronger focus on the shorter term horizons compared to East Asians. Chapter 1 did not 
explicitly test the effect of choice on future time perception with different cultural groups. 
The prior literature has noted cultural differences in the perception of choices. For 
example, Americans were more likely than Indians to construe actions as choices 
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(Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010). Such cultural differences in the 
perception of choices are likely to lead to cultural differences in future time perception.  
The cultural differences on prospection may reflect each cultural group’s 
adaptation to their own environment. For example, the finding that East Asians show a 
stronger focus on the longer term compared to North Americans in Chapter 3 may be 
related to East Asians’ history and practice of growing rice. Talhelm et al. (2014) have 
shown that the rice growing may have caused people in South China to show more 
collectivism compared to people in the North China who plant wheat, because growing 
rice requires more large-scale collaboration than growing wheat. This shows that the 
specific requirement for growing rice or wheat may have caused cultural differences. 
Another feature of growing rice plantation is that it requires planting a few times per 
year. Because of the multiple planting cycles, people have to plant and harvest very 
promptly according to a schedule. People who plant rice may have to plan ahead far more 
into the future and show a longer term future orientation. The domestication of rice 
occurred in East Asia and even today China produces the largest quantity of rice in the 
world. It is notable that Southern China, Korea and Japan, the major sources of East 
Asian data, have rice as their major staple grain. This may relate to East Asians’ longer 
term future orientation compared to North Americans. 
Future research may 1) more precisely describe the cultural differences in 
prospection, across different situations and framings, with different methods of eliciting 
preferences or choice (See Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008); and 2) examine the 
mechanisms of such cultural differences. Why different cultures show a difference in 
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prospection? How do such cultural differences in prospection illuminate each culture’s 
story of adaptation to their own environment?  
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